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This Article concerns the prosecution of defensive dishonesty in the
course of federal investigations. It sketches a conceptual framework for
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and related false statement charges,
distinguishes between harmful deception and the typical investigative
interaction, and describes the range of lies that fall within the wide margins of
the offense. It then places these cases in a socio-legal context, suggesting that
some false statement charges function as penalties for defendants’ refusal to
expedite investigations into their own wrongdoing. In those instances, the
government positions itself as the victim of the lying offense and reasserts its
authority through prosecution. Efficiency rather than accuracy goals drive
enforcement decisions in marginal criminal lying cases, which may produce
unintended consequences. Using false statement charges as pretexts for other
harms can diminish transparency and mute signals to comply. Accountability
also suffers when prosecutors can effectively create offenses, and when it is the
interaction with the government itself rather than conduct with freestanding
illegality that forms the core violation. The disjunction between prosecutions
and social norms about defensive dishonesty may also result in significant
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credibility costs and cause some erosion of voluntary compliance. Animating
the materiality requirement in the statute with attention to the harm caused or
risked by particular false statements could mitigate these distortions. An
inquiry into the objective impact of a false statement might account for the
nature of the underlying conduct under investigation, whether the questioning
at issue is pretextual, whether the lie is induced, and whether the deception
succeeds or could succeed in harming the investigation. By taking materiality
seriously, courts could curtail prosecutorial discretion and narrow application
of the statute to cases where prosecution harmonizes with social norms.
INTRODUCTION
Process offenses that arise during white collar investigations rather than
from the commission of the crime itself have increasingly been the focus of
federal prosecution. In several recent cases, high-profile targets in the worlds of
business, politics, and sports have started out implicated in scandals and ended
up guilty of crimes because they attempted to minimize their misconduct when
questioned by government officials. This Article concerns the prosecution of
particular process crimes—defensive deception in response to questioning by
government agents—and the effect those cases may have on enforcement goals
and the public’s cooperation with evidence gathering in other investigations.
Part I describes everyday lies, compares them to typical investigative
interactions, and then considers the broad range of conduct within the scope of
18 U.S.C. § 1001 and related false statement offenses. Current enforcement
strategies authorize the pursuit of organic falsehood: reactive
misrepresentations that arise solely as a result of the defendant’s engagement
with government agents. The statute also permits charges for proxy deception,
including statements made to state officials and nongovernmental parties who
then relay them to the federal government. Although in some cases organic and
proxy false statement charges merely supplement the underlying crimes, in
others, there is no stand-alone offense, and false statements supply the only
prosecutable crime.
Part II examines the potential for prosecutorial misuse of the statute,
including the possibility of crime creation and overcharging for plea-bargaining
purposes. Prosecutors may use false statement charges to constructively amend
white collar statutes that do not reach a defendant’s conduct. Although § 1001
ostensibly protects the accuracy of information, the nature of the offense does
more to increase efficiency than to enhance truth-seeking. Prosecutions proceed
as well to penalize defendants’ recalcitrance and to assert governmental
authority, or to force apologies. But those justifications may ultimately be
undermined by what false statement prosecutions signify.
Part III discusses the unintended consequences of the current enforcement
strategy, including the signals sent by prosecuting the full spectrum of false
statements. Because such charges are often pretexts for punishing unprovable
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offenses, and because plea-bargaining resolutions are likely, they reduce transparency. Prosecutorial accountability further decreases when the interaction
with law enforcement itself forms the core violation, rather than independent
criminal conduct that predates the investigation. Credibility costs are
substantial as well. Many theorists have argued that calibrating law to reflect
social norms is essential to the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement, and
several factors indicate discord here: the lack of consensus among moral
philosophers about defensive falsehoods that merely mislead, social
psychology concerning deception success rates, countervailing norms about
self-protective perjury, and the response to recent, high-profile cases. Deep
deterrence of harmless lies may lead to diminished compliance and other
backfire effects, so that an offense that ostensibly protects the government’s
access to information in practice produces less of it.
Part IV suggests that one approach to mitigating these expressive
distortions and safeguarding against abuse would be to animate the materiality
requirement in the statute with independent content derived from the “harm
principle.”1 Structural deficiencies hinder many proposals to check
prosecutorial discretion, but the existing language in § 1001 provides a point of
entry for judicial line-drawing. Courts might raise the costs of prosecution by
scrutinizing the objective implications of false statements or omissions,
including the significance of the underlying conduct, whether the defendant
initiated the statement, what information government agents already possessed,
and any resulting harm or risk to the investigation.
I
DEFINING FALSE STATEMENTS IN INVESTIGATIONS
Section 1001 is an expansive provision with terms that have been
interpreted to punish not only conduct that impedes an investigation but also
evasions or understatements that merely fail to expedite it.2 The statute
prohibits making a “materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation” or falsifying, concealing, or covering up “by any trick, scheme,
1. In general terms, the “harm principle” holds that “harmless immoralities should not be
officially prohibited or punished.” John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in Harm and
Culpability 103, 127 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); see also John Stuart Mill,
On Liberty 22 (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”).
2. The statute provides for a fine and a maximum sentence of five years for:
[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006); see also Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 416 (1998)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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or device a material fact” in any matter within the jurisdiction of the federal
government.3 Liability requires a knowing and willful falsehood (which could
take the form of misleading, misrepresenting, or concealing) that is material to
a matter within federal jurisdiction.
In its current form, the statute has drifted from its core purpose of protecting governmental interests and preventing the loss of information and has
instead become a tool for penalizing otherwise unreachable defendants or
forcing cooperation with an inquiry.4 The potential for abuse arises from the
fact that lying may be the most ordinary human activity to be regulated through
the criminal law. It is not unusual for prosecutors to charge readily provable
offenses, such as tax evasion, as pretexts for more serious crimes that raise
strategic difficulties. Nor is it uncommon for law enforcement to use devices
such as traffic stops to further the course of investigations into broader
wrongdoing. But false statements are not actionable, in the way that either
pretext crimes or infractions that create investigative opportunity would be,
absent interaction with law enforcement. Because dishonesty is pervasive and
derives its entire criminal content under § 1001 from contact with the
government, the government exercises some control over when and whether an
offense is committed.
A. Everyday Lies
Deception is part of our everyday interactions; it surrounds us in the form
of social niceties, misleading statements, wishful thinking, exaggerations,
concealment, and flat untruths.5 Lying is difficult to recreate clinically or study
empirically, but recent research provides some evidence of its frequency.
Studies have revealed that as many as one out of three job applicants lies to
potential employers; that nine out of ten college students have lied to sexual
partners; and that study participants lied to about a third of the people with
3. Section 1001 is the center of my analysis and the most widely used of the false statement
offenses, but there are companion provisions that criminalize particular kinds of false statements,
including: claims against the United States government, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006); statements to
FDIC-insured banks, 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2006); and statements related to ERISA filings, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1017 (2006). Approximately 100 additional federal false statement statutes were catalogued in
the dissenting opinion in United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 959–60 nn.3 & 4 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
4. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1881–82
(2000) (“A century ago, lying raised moral and reputational questions but only rarely legal ones.
Today, lying by any government official or lying in the course of any business transaction is
usually a felony.”).
5. See David Livingstone Smith, Why We Lie 2 (2004) (“From the fairy tales our
parents told us to the propaganda our governments feed us, human beings spend their lives
surrounded by pretense.”); id. at 9 (“Lying is universal—we all do it; we all must do it.”) (quoting
Mark Twain); Evelin Sullivan, The Concise Book of Lying 61 (2001) (“Deception is
widespread, and it appears in so many different ways, and has so many effects—ranging from
miniscule to fatal—that it can safely be said to be more complicated than anything else we do that
carries a moral cargo.”).
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whom they spoke in a given week.6 Any statement on the frequency of lying
depends on how deception is characterized. Some diary studies suggest that the
average person tells one or two lies a day, but one set of subjects recording
daily interactions identified as many as three fibs or fabrications for every ten
minutes of conversation.7 Of course, many of these statistics concern “false
positives” in the form of relatively innocuous social lies,8 and flattery or
puffery occurs with much greater frequency than the denials of culpability that
give rise to criminal liability. The very prevalence and predictability of human
deception, however, underscores some potential for manipulation by
prosecutors. And lies may be even more unexceptional in the interactions
between the government and witnesses or suspects. Deception often arises from
fear, an emotion felt acutely in criminal inquiries, and it typically aims at
control,9 a desire central to the power struggle in an investigative interview.
Like the other commonplace deceptions mentioned here, investigative lies are
often anticipated and insignificant, but they can give rise to liability
nonetheless. Given the high incidence of dishonesty and the simple yet
sweeping elements of the statute, prosecutors can precipitate offenses to refresh
stale investigations or to force plea bargaining.
Because of the broad scope of the language of § 1001, there is both this
potential for overreaching and a great deal of underenforcement. While better
sorting is necessary, decriminalizing lies altogether seems ill advised.
Investigators are rightly concerned that dishonesty with and hostility toward the
government are increasing, even as there is a growing need for voluntary
compliance to address complex enforcement problems like corporate crime.
The issue is not whether the prosecutors should pursue false statements at all
but whether the plus factor that they apply when selecting cases is too often the
defendant’s identity and too rarely the egregiousness of the offense.10

6. See Livingstone Smith, supra note 5, at 18–19; Bella M. DePaulo et al., Lying in
Everyday Life, 70 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 979, 991 (1996).
7. Compare DePaulo, supra note 6, at 991 with Livingstone Smith, supra note 5, at 15.
8. Cf. David Nyberg, The Varnished Truth: Truth Telling and Deceiving in
Ordinary Life 53 (1993) (intentional deceit can be a creative and compassionate alternative to
truth-telling).
9. As Evelin Sullivan observes:
[T]he answer to why the liar wants the truth kept from being known or a falsehood
believed [is obvious]. The fear of losing something—money, a job, a marriage, power,
respect, reputation, love, life, freedom, comfort, enjoyment, cooperation, etc., etc.—is
one reason; the desire to gain something—a better job, admission to a desired school
. . . money, revenge, love, cooperation, respect and admiration, control and power,
comfort and convenience, and so forth—is another.
Sullivan, supra note 5, at 57.
10. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. &
Criminology 3, 5 (1940–1941) (“If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that
he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will
pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.”).
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In some important respects, defensive false statements to government
agents fall outside traditional understandings about serious deception. Lying is
often defined as “telling or otherwise communicating a falsehood with the
intention to deceive,”11 and at least some philosophical definitions require, as
well, an expectation of success at deception.12 For some suspects being interviewed, however, there may be little expectation of success and an intention
primarily to change the subject. Many courts have held that whether or not the
agent believes the false statement to be true has no bearing on the applicability
of the statute,13 but on one theory, “falsehood ceases to be falsehood when it is
understood on all sides that the truth is not expected to be spoken.”14 Agents
and prosecutors are sufficiently acclimated to the likelihood of deception that
they know that a witness, even one who is not a suspect, will frame events to
protect herself and minimize any exposure. This is unsurprising given society’s
distrust of government agents. The natural reaction of most subjects confronted
by investigators is to respond in a way that deflects scrutiny and forestalls
liability—a reaction that agents generally anticipate.15
Nor do concerns about lying from the realm of applied ethics seem
particularly applicable to the context of a criminal investigation. Lying
classically involves “the creation, and simultaneous breach, of a relationship of
trust between a speaker and listener,”16 but the relationship between agents and
11. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 5, at 57.
12. See Roderick M. Chisholm & Thomas D. Feehan, The Intent to Deceive, 74 J. Phil.
143, 159 (1977); James Edwin Mahon, The Definition of Lying and Deception, in Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Feb. 21, 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition/
(noting one definition of lying as making “a believed-false statement to another person, with the
intention that that other person believe that statement to be true, violating that person’s right of
liberty of judgment, with the intention to harm that other person”).
13. See United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 1998) (statement was
material even though the agents called defendant a liar immediately after he made it); United
States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he test is the intrinsic
capabilities of the false statement itself, rather than the possibility of the actual attainment of its
end as measured by collateral circumstances.”).
14. Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, in Ethical Issues in Business 46, 46
(Thomas Donaldson & Patricia Werhane eds., 1979) (quoting British statesman Henry Taylor).
15. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 75 (“[O]nly a perpetrator who is repentant or out to be
punished is honest.”); see also Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“It probably is the normal instinct to deny and conceal any shameful or guilty act.”);
Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a
Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 648 (1991). Friedman stated:
How dire the consequences of the truth must be before a person is willing to tell a lie
may differ from person to person, but it would be hard to deny that virtually everybody
has a tipping point. . . . [A]nd probably for most, the threat of serious criminal
punishment is sufficient.
Id.
16. Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform
the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 Hastings L.J. 157, 166 (2001); see also
Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 67 (1978) (“Every lie is a broken promise . . . made and
broken at the same moment. Every lie necessarily implies—as does every assertion—an
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suspects is not an association founded on trust. To some philosophers, the
damage lying causes comes not from the falsehood itself but from its tendency
to “compromise and corrupt our relationships.”17 But the government and
criminal suspects already are in an adversarial relationship. While lying can
undermine cooperative behavior and exacerbate imbalances of power,18 agents
prepare extensively for interviews in white collar cases, and are neither trusting
nor vulnerable in these scenarios. The interviews that give rise to false
statement charges often involve surprising suspects at odd hours and in
uncomfortable places; those conversations do not resemble ordinary social
interactions within a complex of reciprocal obligations.19 To the extent these
conversations produce exculpatory lies, agents rarely intend to rely on what is
said, and the lies generally cause little harm.20
By way of example, in May 2008, Olympic track coach Trevor Graham
was convicted of one count of lying to federal agents in a steroids probe.
Investigators confronted Graham in 2004 and questioned him about his contacts
with a steroids dealer. At the time, Graham asserted that he had not spoken to
the dealer since 1997, but prosecutors had already obtained phone records
showing nearly 100 calls Graham placed to him between 1998 and 2000.
Although jurors convicted Graham on that false statement, they acquitted him
of two additional counts, including his false claim that he had never met the
dealer in person. After the verdict, the jury foreperson expressed general skepticism about the government’s case, including the lack of any contemporaneous
interview notes, and the reasons for withholding the phone records instead of
confronting Graham directly. “It was like they wanted to catch him,” the juror
remarked, and “[i]t got me to questioning the government themselves.”21
Although deception may be integral to criminal activity, many view it as
less reprehensible than the underlying crimes themselves. Yet the spare requireassurance, a warranty of its truth.”).
17. Robert C. Solomon, Is It Ever Right to Lie? The Philosophy of Deception, Chron.
Higher Educ. (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 27, 1998, at A60; see also Robert C. Solomon, What a
Tangled Web: Deception and Self-Deception in Philosophy, in Lying and Deception in
Everyday Life 30, 40 (Michael Lewis & Carolyn Saarni eds., 1993) (“Lying is wrong because it
constitutes a breach of trust, which is not a principle but a very particular and personal
relationship between people.” (citation omitted)).
18. See Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life 20, 28–30
(1978) (noting that deception increases imbalances of power and that lying undermines trust
relationships); Robert N. Van Wyk, When is Lying Morally Permissible?: Casuistical Reflections
on the Game Analogy, Self-Defense, Social Contract Ethics, and Ideals, 24 J. Value Inquiry
155, 155 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 Tex. L. Rev. 1275, 1291–92
(2007) (discussing potential moral limitations on the use of deception by law enforcement during
interrogations).
20. Cf. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *137 (referring to perjury and stating
that “if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid, it is not
penal”).
21. See Amy Shipley, Graham Is Convicted of Lying to Investigators, Wash. Post, May
30, 2008, at E3.
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ments for liability mean that “anything more than a casual social conversation
with a Government employee [c]ould, without warning, subject the speaker to
the possibility of severe criminal punishment.”22 And the wide and irregular
margins of the offense allow for the possibility that “an overzealous prosecutor
or investigator—aware that a person has committed some suspicious acts, but
unable to make a criminal case—will create a crime by surprising the suspect,
asking about those acts, and receiving a false denial.”23
B. The Wide Margins of the False Statement Offense
There are almost 4,000 federal offenses, and approximately 300 of them
criminalize deception in its various forms.24 The primary concern of this Article
is accounting for the expansion of charges for unsworn statements to the
government.25 In some notable respects—including the situations in which
cases arise, what motivates prosecutors to pursue them, and the costs of an
aggressive enforcement strategy—false statement offenses differ from other
forms of criminal lying. The perjury statute, which punishes knowingly making
false, material statements under oath, protects the integrity of the court
system.26 The many obstruction provisions prohibit interference with court or
agency proceedings, destruction of evidence, or the disruption of pending
investigations.27 In some cases, obstruction and false statements are
interchangeable, but § 1001 has a more rapid trigger and allows prosecutors to
impose sanctions for dishonesty from the moment a suspect or witness
encounters the government. It makes almost any falsehood actionable, without
regard to the stage of the investigation or the relevance of the statement to
underlying wrongdoing. The statute is sufficiently broad to reach
22. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967), abrogated by United
States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984), as recognized in United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14
F.3d 1040, 1050 (5th Cir. 1994).
23. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 416 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
24. See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform,
2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 249, 289 (1998).
25. As a general matter, it is difficult to gather accurate data on the prevalence of false
statement prosecutions, as they often are not the lead charge in an indictment, and they tend to be
aggregated with false claims, perjury, and obstruction of justice charges in federal statistics. Taken
together, however, statistics on federal prosecutions indicate a steady increase in false statement
cases, which appeared to double between 1997 and 2007, from approximately 600 to
approximately 1200 filed annually. See, e.g., TRAC, Syracuse University, White Collar
Crime Prosecutions for January 2007 (2007), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/
white_collar_crime/monthlyjan07/fil/ (greatest increase in number of white collar prosecutions
between 2006 and 2007 was a 31.9 percent increase in § 1001 charges); Erin Murphy,
Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 Geo. L.J. 1435, 1468 (2009)
(“[A]necdotal reports seem to suggest that federal prosecutors have brought greater numbers of
prosecutions for false statement offenses in recent years.”).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (2006).
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006) (obstruction before federal courts and grand jury);
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006) (obstruction before agencies); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006) (witness
tampering).
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nondisclosure, and the Supreme Court has noted that its terms encompass
“unadorned” false denials that mislead no one.28
To be clear, both perjury and obstruction are serious crimes that can
undermine the integrity of the courts and the criminal justice system as a whole.
And false statements can cause similar institutional harms and obscure
information necessary to enforce the law. The statutory language is so opentextured, however, that prosecutions can stray from the statute’s core objective.29 The obstruction statute, although rather broad itself,30 contains some
constraints absent from § 1001. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that
the deception must have some nexus to official proceedings, and therefore that
a false statement to an investigating agent who was not acting as an arm of the
grand jury did not constitute obstruction.31 The standards for proving perjury
are significantly more stringent,32 perjurious statements can be recanted, and
superfluous testimony, even though false, does not give rise to liability for
perjury. A perjury conviction also requires the formalities of a sworn statement
given during an official proceeding, whereas § 1001 imposes “no requirement
of an oath, no strict rule of materiality, and no guarantee that the proceeding
will be transcribed or reduced to memorandum.”33
The circumstances of the typical interview, moreover, “do not sufficiently
alert the person interviewed to the danger that false statements may lead to a
felony conviction.”34 The courtroom itself puts a defendant on notice of
potential liability for falsehood, and the playing field there is more level—in
terms of both available information and legal representation—than the
imbalanced investigative interactions during which many § 1001 violations
occur.35 Actionable false statements can transpire in informal settings like the
defendant’s driveway, and conversations with agents are very rarely framed

28. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410.
29. This evolution parallels the drift in the “honest services” theory of fraud, which has
transformed fairly workaday conduct into a crime by defining disloyalty itself as the harm rather
than requiring a tangible loss of property. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2006) (fraud includes
depriving another of “the intangible right of honest services”). See also generally John C. Coffee,
Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991).
30. See Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction
Statutes As Case Study, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 677 (2006) (“[W]hite-collar prosecutors are increasingly electing to rely on obstruction charges in high-profile cases such as the
criminal prosecutions of Frank Quattrone (former star banker for Credit Suisse First Boston),
Andrew Fastow (former CFO of Enron), Martha Stewart, Sam Waksal (founder of ImClone
Systems), Arthur Andersen LLP, and ‘Scooter’ Libby . . . .”).
31. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995).
32. See, e.g., Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962), abrogated by
Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401, 408, and United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994).
33. See United States v. Ehrlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D.D.C. 1974).
34. Id.
35. See United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183 (1st Cir. 1975), abrogated by Brogan,
522 U.S. at 401, 408.
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with any warning about potential liability.36
Nor is the ease with which false statements can be pursued and sanctioned
proportionate to the relative impact these statements have on the institution of
criminal justice. Perjury can harm the justice system itself by threatening the
function of the courts. Some forms of obstruction cut off the flow of
information to both prosecutors and jurors and hinder the “fine judgments”37
they are called upon to make. Enforcing these offenses, the theory goes,
“further[s] the interest of truth-finding and allow[s] the prosecution’s case to be
put to the test.”38 Conversely, false statement charges too often insulate the
prosecution’s case from scrutiny. Rather than increasing the flow of information, false statement charges can truncate investigations and lead to coarse
charging decisions. They may result in more plea bargains and thereby mitigate
trial risk, avert any challenge to the underlying case, and preclude meaningful
judicial oversight.
This is true, to some extent, of lesser offenses likely to induce pleas in any
investigation, including such strategic charges as the failure to pay taxes on illgotten gains or the use of a communications device in a drug transaction. But
those violations generally occur before the government gets involved, while
false statement charges result from investigators’ ex post opportunism. As
Justice Ginsburg wrote in Brogan v. United States, the statute “arms
Government agents with authority not simply to apprehend lawbreakers, but to
generate felonies, crimes of a kind that only a Government officer could
prompt.”39
36. See Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism of the “Testimonial”
Statement Concept, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 429, 439 n.45 (2007) (noting that the “function of the
publicly administered oath”—“‘calculated to awaken the witness’ conscience and impress the
witness’ mind with the duty to [testify truthfully]’”—“would appear qualitatively quite different in
terms of its effect on solemnity” from the unannounced sanctions for false statements to
investigators) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 603 advisory committee’s note) (alteration in original); see
also Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410–11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the
“extremely informal circumstances” of agent interviews) (quoting United States v. Ehrlichman,
379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D.D.C. 1974)).
37. See Patrick Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, Announcing Indictment of Lewis Libby, Oct.
28, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/28/
AR2005102801340.html (the harm of the obstruction charged in the Libby case is that it
prevented prosecutors from “making the fine judgments we want to make”); see also United
States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 530 (5th Cir. 2006) (perjurious testimony before a grand jury
“clos[es] off entirely the avenues of inquiry being pursued”) (quoting United States v. Williams,
874 F.2d 968, 981 (5th Cir. 1989)).
38. Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White
Collar Crime 181 (2006).
39. 522 U.S. at 409 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also id. at 409 n.1 (citing William J.
Schwartz, Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under the Federal False Statement Statute,
77 Colum. L. Rev. 316, 325–26 (1977)). Justice Ginsburg stated:
Since agents may often expect a suspect to respond falsely to their questions, the statute
is a powerful instrument with which to trap a potential defendant. Investigators need
only informally approach the suspect and elicit a false reply and they are assured of a
conviction with a harsh penalty even if they are unable to prove the underlying
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There has been little critical examination, however, of the primary statute
that criminalizes lying to the government, and no sustained effort to unpack
what sorts of statements constitute “lies” and what audience is the equivalent of
the “government.” Despite occasional expressions of judicial and scholarly
concern,40 § 1001 is an undertheorized offense that has received scant attention
since the Supreme Court’s 1998 rejection of a distinction between deliberate,
affirmative statements and mere denials in response to questioning.41 Ten years
after the Brogan decision, which also highlighted the dangers of the statute and
sounded a cautionary note for prosecutors and Congress, § 1001 continues to
provide federal agents with “a potent combination of an investigatory and
prosecutorial tool.”42 Using that tool on defensive false statements or on
deception to proxies for the government may further procedural expediency,
but without necessarily increasing accuracy or protecting institutional values.
1. Organic Falsehood: The Meaning of Lying
Perhaps the most problematic feature of § 1001 liability is that its broad
scope invites prosecutions for statements initiated by law enforcement.
“Organic false statements” are those that arise naturally from the interaction
between agents and suspects or witnesses in an investigation. They are inherent
in those interactions—spontaneous and unrefined. They can involve defendants
who enter a conversation technically innocent but end up exposed to criminal
liability because they lie reflexively to protect themselves from embarrassing
revelations rather than to obstruct legitimate prosecutions.43 Law enforcement
might, for example, question a suspect who has no involvement in the offense
under investigation but offers a false alibi to disguise a noncriminal
indiscretion. The expansive nature of the offense and minimal requirement of
substantive crime.
Id.
40. See United States v. Lambert, 470 F.2d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 1972) (“Were [§ 1001] to be
applied in every situation consonant with its literal wording any individual who passed on to a
governmental agency the most trivial bit of misinformation would be criminally liable for his
statement.”), vacated en banc, 501 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d
1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[V]irtually any false statement, sworn or unsworn, written or oral,
made to a government employee could be penalized as a felony.”); Green, supra note 16, at 191
(describing the false statement statutes as “a complex, chameleon-like body of law with few clear
governing principles”).
41. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998). See, e.g., Giles A. Birch, Comment,
False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1273 (1990); John Poggioli, Note, Judicial Reluctance to Enforce the Federal False Statement
Statute in Investigatory Situations, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 515 (1982). Stuart Green’s scholarship
integrating moral theory with the doctrines governing various white collar crimes is a notable
recent exception. See Green, supra note 38.
42. Norman Abrams & Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Law and Its
Enforcement 717 (4th ed. 2006).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp. 2d 24, 42 (D.D.C. 1998) (dishonesty
concerned amount and quantity rather than existence of bank checks during a background check).
See also generally O’Sullivan, supra note 30 (analyzing overbroad obstruction statutes).
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materiality make offering the untrue (but technically irrelevant) alibi a felony.
The statute allows investigators to refresh stale crimes as well. If investigators
confront a defendant with wrongdoing on which the statute of limitations has
long since run, and the defendant denies it, she has committed a new, actionable crime.44
It is not necessary to stage a parade of horribles to make this point; on-theground enforcement offers ample illustrations of crime creation.45 Assume that
FBI agents approach you about a corruption investigation after tape-recording a
transaction between you and an informant. They ask you whether you engaged
in the transaction, and you say, simply, “no.” According to the court, by
foreclosing the line of inquiry into possible innocent explanations for the
transaction, you made a material false statement actionable under § 1001.46 Or
suppose you are a notary, and an IRS agent appears at your door and tells you
she is investigating a man named “John Doe” and needs to ask you some
questions about how you perform your function as a notary. You state that you
require documents to be signed in person, but it turns out that the agents
possess some documents that you notarized without the presence of the
signatories.47 Because the initial inquiry elicited a false denial, even though
agents already knew the answer, the interview created a federal felony.48 Or
imagine that you are confronted with copies of checks indicating that you have
been involved in an extortion scheme. You do not deny that you received and
cashed the checks, but you do minimize your involvement by saying that one of
them was for your winnings in a Super Bowl pool. When an investigator
notices that the check predated the Super Bowl game, you say that maybe the
payor “knew I was going to win.”49 Although an obviously futile attempt to
avoid detection, the statement is a separate felony.
In some cases, organic obstruction supplants rather than supplements
other suspected criminal activity. This occurs most frequently in prosecutions
involving high-profile liars but very personal lies. One example is the prosecution of Martha Stewart, who was accused of acting on insider information when

44. In Brogan, for example, the statute of limitations had run on 4 of the 5 underlying
substantive offenses. See 522 U.S. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
45. The voluminous federal criminal code invites academics to invent potential problems
around statutes that “politically accountable prosecutors” rarely charge. See Darryl K. Brown,
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 223, 225 (2007) (arguing that many of the
crimes scholars complain about are effectively nullified). Section 1001, however, is frequently
utilized and has yielded enough published cases with questionable fact patterns to raise concern
about the even larger array of convictions by plea agreement for trivial untruths.
46. Cf. United States v. LeMaster, 54 F.3d 1224, 1230 (6th Cir. 1995).
47. Cf. United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Brogan, 522
U.S. at 401, 408.
48. See id. at 719 (the conviction was later reversed according to the now defunct
“exculpatory no” doctrine); see also United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976)
(liability for false statements even where agents asked questions with known answers).
49. See United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1060 (2d Cir. 1986).
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she sold her ImClone stock and then giving federal agents a false explanation
for the transaction. Stewart was ultimately convicted only of lying about the
sale, and the prosecution thus constructively amended the insider trading
provisions to reach her conduct.50 In related examples, former Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros and former President Bill
Clinton both lied to protect themselves from embarrassing revelations rather
than to obstruct potential prosecutions, but their lies then exposed them to
criminal liability.51 And many of the athletes implicated in prosecutions arising
from the steroids scandals were also technically innocent of any federal crime
until the investigation began.
For example, Roger Clemens may have cheated, but he did not necessarily
violate the law when he used (as opposed to distributed) performanceenhancing drugs. Nonetheless, when he professed his innocence during
interviews with members of Congress, even before his sworn testimony, he
came within the ambit of § 1001, which extends to investigations conducted by
congressional committees. Congress has since asked the Justice Department to
investigate not just whether Clemens perjured himself in the hearing, but
whether he made statements in violation of § 1001 in the course of the
congressional investigation. One of the few players to be prosecuted as a result
of the investigation into steroids in baseball has not been accused of using
performance-enhancing drugs and instead stands convicted of misleading
statements about whether he knew other players were doing so. Miguel
Tejada—with regard to whom prosecutors acknowledge they have no evidence
of steroid use—was questioned by congressional investigators in an unsworn
interview in a Baltimore hotel. During the interview, Tejada responded “no”
when asked in various ways whether he was aware of other players using

50. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy
and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 2023, 2024–25 (2005)
(“[Government] was reduced, in effect, to arguing that it was illegal for her to lie about something
that was not illegal and that her protestations of innocence constituted the fraud upon which she
should be considered guilty.”); Ellen S. Podgor, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Should be
Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109 Penn St. L. Rev. 1059, 1070 (2005) (“[Stewart] went, and
she talked, but they did not like what was said. Therefore, they proceeded to charge her with
crimes related to lying instead of proceeding exclusively in the civil sphere or charging the
substantive crimes for which they were initially investigating her.”).
51. Cisneros admitted to the FBI that he made payments to a woman with whom he once
had an affair but was then indicted for false statements about the timing and amount of the
payments. Some commentators have connected the increase in false statement prosecutions to the
institutionalization of the independent counsel law in the 1980s and the subsequent prosecutions
(later overturned on appeal) of Oliver North and John Poindexter. See, e.g., Paul Glastris, “False
Statements”: The Flubber of All Laws, U.S. News & World Rep., Mar. 30, 1998, at 25. Ronald
Blakely, for example, chief of staff to Mike Espy, was convicted of false statements in the
investigation of Mr. Espy for taking favors from companies who did business with the Department
of Agriculture. Special prosecutor Donald Smaltz pursued Blakely for $22,000 in outside income
that he failed to report on financial disclosure forms. See David Stout, Prosecution That Spared
Espy Leaves a Top Aide in Ruins, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1999, at A30.
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steroids.52 The congressional referral states that the veracity of Tejada’s
assertion that “he had no knowledge of other players using or even talking
about steroids or other banned substances” materially influenced the House
Oversight Committee’s investigation.53 Tejada did not provide false
information; he merely denied discussing steroids with two other players
(neither of whom has been charged with any offense) and thereby may have
failed to expedite the congressional investigation. Congressional prerogative to
pursue investigations and hold hearings on matters of public concern is
important, and some leverage over witnesses is appropriate. It is rather
attenuated, however, to charge a baseball player with lying about whether other
players were truthful when they testified in an investigation that has produced
no legislation and no prosecutions for the use of the drugs themselves.
At the far reaches of the statute lies the defensive deception referred to as
an “exculpatory no”: a false response to an investigator’s accusation in a form
such as “no” or “wasn’t me.” These reflexive reactions were treated in the
majority of circuit courts as constructive “not guilty” pleas,54 and an “exculpatory no” defense to § 1001 charges was valid until the 1998 decision in Brogan
v. United States.55 Consider the facts of the Brogan case itself. Federal agents
knocked on James Brogan’s door one evening, unannounced. Well before they
went to his home, they had obtained records verifying that Brogan had received
funds from a company that employed members of the union for which he
served as an officer. The agents told Brogan that they were investigating the
company and various individuals and asked him whether he had received any
money or gifts from the company. Brogan responded: “No.” Agents then told
him that they had the records of payments to him and that he had just
committed a crime by lying to them. As Justice Ginsburg concluded, “when the
interview ended, a[nother] federal offense had been completed—even though,
for all we can tell, Brogan’s unadorned denial misled no one.”56 The Supreme
Court rejected the defense on statutory interpretation grounds, but the concerns
that led courts to judicially construct the “exculpatory ‘no’” doctrine precluding

52. Information at 4, United States v. Tejada, No. 09-MJ-077 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2009).
53. See id. at 4–5; Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform, H. Rep. & Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, to Michael B. Mukasey,
Attorney General, U.S. (Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/
sports/housecommittee. 2008.1.15.pdf.
54. See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473–74 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated by
Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 401, 408 (1998); United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801,
804 (8th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401, 408; United States v. Equihua-Juarez,
851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401, 408; United States v.
Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 719 (11th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401, 408; United
States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1980), abrogated by Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401,
408; United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183–84 (1st Cir. 1975), abrogated by Brogan, 522
U.S. at 401, 408.
55. 522 U.S. at 410 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
56. Id.
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prosecution for simple denials of guilt remain.57
Nor have defendants prevailed on the theory that organic falsehoods result
from sprung perjury traps, despite the risk that the government can use criminal
lying charges to “escalate completely innocent conduct into a felony.”58 The
subjective test for entrapment is “whether the defendant is a person otherwise
innocent whom the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense
which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials.”59 As a general
matter, federal criminal provisions do not apply where agents “instigate” a
person to commit an offense,60 but demonstrating entrapment requires proof of
both inducement and lack of predisposition. Proving a negative—that one did
not have a predisposition to lie—may be impossible and at the very least
presents evidentiary challenges that the defendant lured into an uncharacteristic
narcotics deal would not face.
Nothing prevents the government from initiating questioning without any
reasonable expectation that it will produce probative evidence. Because investigations are dynamic and prosecutors’ motives are often mixed, to demonstrate
that the sole and exclusive purpose of questioning is to extract perjury presents
a virtually insurmountable hurdle.61 Particularly in the corporate realm, where
the truth about complicated transactions involves some interpretation, defendants who might be clear of any wrongdoing can nonetheless be “ensnared by
ambiguous circumstances.”62 Some false statements occur, not because of
consciousness of guilt, but because of consciousness of risk, or even indignation about innocence.63
Parsing language or relying on technicalities provides no defense either;
the government can bring charges even in the absence of outright lies because
implied falsity suffices for a conviction.64 Once a citizen responds to questioning, she “has an obligation to refrain from telling half-truths or from excluding
information necessary to make [her] statements accurate.”65 Section 1001 can
57. See id. at 411; see also United States v. Yermian 468 U.S. 63, 81 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that § 1001 is “intended to deter the perpetration of deliberate deceit on the
Federal Government” not to “criminalize the making of even the most casual false statements so
long as they turned out, unbeknownst to their maker, to be material to some federal agency
function”).
58. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410–11 (noting the solicitor general’s acknowledgment at oral
argument that §1001 could be used to create a felony charge).
59. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
60. Id. at 435.
61. Bennett L. Gershman, The “Perjury Trap,” 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624, 684 (1981)
(explaining that the “sole and exclusive purpose” test for perjury traps is “so restrictive that it
affords virtually no protection at all from prosecutorial abuse”).
62. Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956).
63. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 317 (1850) (“[A]n innocent
man, when placed by circumstances in a condition of suspicion and danger, may resort to
deception in the hope of avoiding the force of such proofs.”).
64. See United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 1998).
65. United States v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp.2d 24, 42 (D.D.C. 1998). See also Susan R.
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also target sins of omission: incomplete statements that “merely mislead.”
“Caveat auditor” principles, according to which “a listener is responsible, or
partly responsible, for ascertaining that a statement is true before believing
it,”66 do not apply. And unlike the perjury statute, under which “[p]recise
questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense,”67 § 1001 offers little
opportunity to debate the “meaning of is”; it covers false statements “of
whatever kind.”68
While it is certainly true that suspects have the option to stay silent, rarely
do agents advise them of that option in the informal context of investigative
interviews.69 Moreover, “in our normal social dealings, one who remains silent

Klein, Lies, Omissions, and Concealment: The Golden Rule in Law Enforcement and the Federal
Criminal Code, 39 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1321, 1338 (2007) (“[M]ost courts hold that when a
government official inquires about a fact, the target of the inquiry has a duty to disclose enough
information so that the government is not misled regarding the subject of the inquiry.”); id. at
1339 (once Peter Bacanovic, Martha Stewart’s stock broker, “agreed to discuss the matter . . . he
could not offer only part of the story, nor omit any relevant facts”); United States v. Stewart, 433
F.3d 273, 318–19 (2d Cir. 2006). The court concluded:
Defendant’s legal duty to be truthful under section 1001 included a duty to disclose the
information he had regarding the circumstances of Stewart’s December 27th trade, even
though he voluntarily agreed to speak with investigators. . . . Trial testimony indicated
that the SEC had specifically inquired about Bacanovic’s knowledge of Stewart’s
trades. As a result, it was plausible for the jury to conclude that the SEC’s questioning
had triggered Bacanovic’s duty to disclose and that ample evidence existed that his
concealment was material to the investigation.
Id. In another example, Bristol-Myers recently pled guilty to making false statements in
violation of § 1001 after statements made during settlement negotiations in a civil case came
to the government’s attention because they included disclosures that had not been made to
the FTC. See United States v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 07-CR-140 (D.D.C. May 30,
2007).
66. Green, supra note 38, at 78–79.
67. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360–62 (1973) (statements must be literally
false to sustain perjury charges, not merely evasive and nonresponsive).
68. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998). But cf. Jeremy Campbell, The
Liar’s Tale 11 (2001) (“Many categories of responses which are misleading, evasive,
nonresponsive or frustrating are nevertheless not legally ‘false’ [including] literally truthful
answers that imply facts that are not true.”) (quoting President Clinton’s legal brief to the
Arkansas Supreme Court committee considering his disbarment) (alteration in original).
69. In Continental criminal practice, by way of contrast, parties are exempt from perjury
prosecutions because they have no duty to harm their own interests, even though they have a
separate right to refuse to testify. See Mirjan R. Damaska, The Facts of Justice and State
Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 130 (1986) (“To impose on
[civil parties] the duty to tell the truth and thereby to harm their own interests was proclaimed to
be inhumane, akin to a form of moral torture, even though civil parties had also acquired the right
to refuse to testify.”), cited in Green, supra note 38, at 85 n.36. Suspects are generally warned of
their right to silence at an earlier point in the investigation as well. In both Germany and England,
warnings must be given at the point a suspect is being investigated, even if not in custody, and in
Italy, any suspect who begins to make an inculpatory statement to a magistrate or police officer
must be interrupted and informed of the rights to silence and counsel. Gordon Van Kessel,
European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. Va. L. Rev.
799, 808–09 (1998).
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in the face of an accusation often is presumed to be guilty.”70 Few suspects
understand that taking steps in between silence and cooperation can expose
them to criminal liability.71 Section 1001 is not a statute with which agents
often seek compliance ex ante; they typically reveal its reach only after the
false statement is made.72 And saying some version of “not me” is a speech act
that often proves more fateful than “I confess” would have been.
2. Proxy Deception: The Meaning of Government
The jurisdictional requirement in the statute—the necessary link between
the falsehood and agency action—also supplies fairly anemic protection.73
Even if the false statement pertains to a matter outside of the agency’s
regulatory jurisdiction, if the general subject matter of the investigation bears
some relationship to the agency’s authority, that will suffice.74 As things
presently stand, the agency need not even receive or read the statement.75 The
Supreme Court has held, moreover, that a defendant need not know that a
statement concerns a matter “within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States.”76 As a result, defendants theoretically could be
prosecuted for lying to undercover agents, and for providing false statements to
counsel or media that subsequently reach the government. Even if government
agents ask unlawful questions, false responses remain punishable.77 To add yet
70. Green, supra note 38, at 85 n.34.
71. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 404 (1998) (“Whether or not the predicament of the wrongdoer
run to ground tugs at the heartstrings, neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment
confers a privilege to lie.”); see also Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969) (Fifth
Amendment does not protect falsehoods); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he
knowingly false statement . . . do[es] not enjoy constitutional protection.”).
72. See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
73. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984) (“[T]he term ‘jurisdiction’
should not be given a narrow or technical meaning for purposes of § 1001.”) (quoting Bryson, 396
U.S. at 70).
74. See United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1979).
75. United States v. Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 532 (11th Cir. 1996) (concealment of material
facts while seeking Medicare reimbursement for royalty fees).
76. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68–70 (1984) (government need not prove that
defendant knew of federal agency jurisdiction when making the false statement); see also United
States v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116, 118–19 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant need not have actual
knowledge that the statement was within a federal agency’s jurisdiction); United States v. Green,
745 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1984) (the federal element is strict liability); cf. United States v.
Montemayor, 712 F.2d 104, 108–109 (5th Cir. 1983). The Montemayor court stated:
[W]hen a statement is not submitted directly to a federal agency, knowledge of federal
involvement may be one circumstance to be considered in assessing the potential threat
the statement may be to the proper functioning of the federal agency involved. This
knowledge may be decisive when the involvement of the United States in the matter to
which the statement relates is peripheral. In other instances, a showing that the
defendant had actual knowledge of federal involvement might lessen the need for a
detailed examination of the federal government’s relationship to the statements.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 1978)) (citations omitted).
77. See Bryson, 396 U.S. at 72 (upholding a § 1001 conviction for falsely denying affiliation with the Communist Party in affidavit filed with the NLRB).
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another layer, the false statement charge itself can involve a scheme to deceive,
rather than the specification of particular lies.78 And broad potential liability
arises from statements made to third parties and merely relayed to officials.
Defendants may be prosecuted, for example, for aiding and abetting false
statements. If the treasurer of a campaign files a false Federal Election
Commission report, a donor who exceeded the legal contribution limits or
donated in someone else’s name could be found guilty of aiding and abetting
the concealment of material facts or conspiring to conceal them in violation of
§ 1001, even if prosecutors cannot charge a violation of the campaign finance
provisions themselves.79
Charges for proxy deception—statements, whether offensive or defensive,
made only in a derivative way to the government—are most common in the
corporate context and the parallel realm of obstruction prosecutions.80 Kevin
Ring, a defendant in one of the cases arising from the corruption investigation
of lobbyist Jack Abramoff, was recently charged with obstruction for allegedly
lying to private counsel retained to conduct an internal investigation.81 Defendants involved in the securities fraud case against software company Computer
Associates were prosecuted on the related theory that they knew the statements
they made to their own counsel would be passed on to the government.82
Computer Associates General Counsel Stephen Woghin was indicted for
obstruction in part as a result of professing innocence in a press release. The
Woghin indictment also cites false justifications made to inside auditors and a
“failure to expedite” the investigation.83 Along the same lines, the government
added obstruction charges to an indictment against El Paso Merchant Energy
gas trader Greg Singleton because of statements he made to counsel retained by

78. See United States v. Hubbell, 177 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
79. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994).
80. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311, 371–72 (2007) (describing prosecutors’ use of a novel theory
of obstruction based on self-preserving statements made to nongovernmental parties).
81. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Abramoff Colleague Kevin Ring
Indicted on Public Corruption and Obstruction of Justice Charges (Sept. 8, 2008)
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/md/Public-Affairs/press_releases/press08/FormerAbramoffColleague
KevinRingIndictedonPublicCorruptionandObstructionofJusticeCharges.html.
82. See Alex Berenson, Software Chief Admits to Guilt in Fraud Case, N.Y. Times, Apr.
25, 2006, at A1. The government’s theory was that defendant Kumar effectively misled federal
prosecutors when the results of an internal investigation were passed on to federal investigators by
his counsel. Prosecutors contended that internal statements were intentionally, albeit only
constructively, made to the government. See id.; Alex Berenson, Case Expands Type of Lies
Prosecutors Will Pursue, N.Y. Times, May 17, 2004, at C1; see also Superseding Indictment, at
23, 28, United States v. Kumar, No. 04-CR-846 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005).
83. Information, United States v. Steven Woghin, No. 04-CR-847 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2004). Furthermore, in the case of Computer Associates CFO Ira Zar, the government alleged that
he had provided explanations to outside counsel that armed the attorneys with “false
justifications,” thereby misleading the government. Information, United States v. Ira Zar, No. 04CR-331 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2004).
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his employer.84 The indictment recalls the “failure to expedite” theory from the
Woghin case; it alleges that Singleton “did not disclose” to outside counsel,
“falsely denied,” and “otherwise concealed” the fact that employees had
provided false information to trade publications.85 The obstruction charges cite
only the private exchanges and do not allege that Singleton made false
statements directly to government agents. Instead, the indictment states that
Singleton understood that his comments could be disclosed to “third parties,
including government agencies” and consequently that his conversations with
counsel amounted to intentional obstruction.86 Another recent example comes
from the Rite Aid prosecution, where the defendants were convicted of obstruction charges stemming from interactions with internal investigators retained by
the company.87 How far could these derivative obstruction theories reach in the
§ 1001 context? If statements made to private counsel are obstructive because
they will be relayed to investigators, do defendants who make exculpatory
statements at press conferences risk liability because those will reach the
government as well? That the government can complain of deception even
when it is not the audience for a statement affords prosecutors still more discretion to target ill-defined wrongdoing.
II
INTERPRETING ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
Because false statements arise from and concern the relationship between
the government and the targets of investigations, they raise unique questions
about “why enforcers make the decisions they do.”88 What interests do § 1001
prosecutions serve and what social value do they have? Punishing investigative
lies neither preserves the institution of the courts in the way that prosecuting
perjury does89 nor protects individual victims from the consequences of fraud.
Although on its face the statute protects the accuracy of the information that
individuals convey to the government, the desire for efficiency, the assertion of
authority, and a preoccupation with apology better explain charging decisions.
Many investigations do founder on the dishonesty of witnesses, but
interviews with targets are rarely about truth-seeking. They typically stem from
interactions where the government is in an aggressive rather than reactive

84. Indictment at 16–21, United States v. Singleton, No. 06-CR-080 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 8,
2006).
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id. At trial, Singleton was convicted of one count of wire fraud. The jury deadlocked or
acquitted on the false reporting and obstruction charges. John C. Roper, Verdict, Deadlock in Gas
Trading Case, Hous. Chron., Aug. 4, 2006, at 3.
87. See Indictment at 76–80, United States v. Grass, No. 02-CR-146 (M.D. Pa. June 21,
2002).
88. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1899.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Manfredonia, 414 F.2d 760, 764 (2d Cir. 1969) (“[Perjury is
punished] for the wrong done to the courts and the administration of justice . . . .”).
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posture. In a scenario where agents provide no warnings and ask questions with
known answers, they predict that suspects will lie and hope that they do. While
questioning might produce a confession, agents generally have passed the
primary information-gathering stage of the investigation when they confront
the target. If the interview is unsuccessful, little harm comes to the
investigation. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, a dishonest response in a
confrontation with a suspect does not deter the agency because a competent
investigator “will anticipate that the defendant will make exculpatory
statements.”90 Although agents rely on self-inculpatory statements or other
cooperation, they generally ignore the foreseen exculpatory ones.
Social psychology offers some helpful insights into the limited potential
of protective and reflexive lying. Bella DePaulo, for example, has documented
experiments indicating that lies are more often revealed in settings in which
motivation to succeed at deceiving the audience is high, but expectations for
success are low.91 Cues to deception also appear strongest when the lie
concerns a transgression, and the lies that deceivers are most highly motivated
to get away with are precisely the ones that are easily detected.92 Another study
concluded that the higher the degree of “detection apprehension,” the stronger
the signals of deception.93 As David Livingstone Smith describes:
Our impressive skill at thinking several moves ahead is a mixed
blessing, for it makes us painfully conscious of the consequences
awaiting those cheaters who trip up. The greater the risk, the more selfconscious we become, and heightened consciousness creates a brand
new problem. We become nervous liars, and the more nervous we
become, the more likely we are to betray our dishonesty accidentally.94

90. United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1986). See also United
States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (concluding that the “only possible
effect of exculpatory denials” is to “stimulate the agent to carry out his function”).
91. See Bella M. DePaulo, Carol Steele LeMay & Jennifer A. Epstein, Effects of
Importance of Success and Expectations for Success on Effectiveness at Deceiving, 17
Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 14–24 (1991). Compare Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M.
DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 214–34
(2006) (studies show that subjects with no special training will correctly judge deception 54
percent of the time).
92. See Bella M. DePaulo et al., The Motivational Impairment Effect in the Communication
of Deception, 12 J. Nonverbal Behav. 177 (1988); Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception,
129 Psychol. Bull. 74 (2003).
93. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 145–46 (documenting an experiment conducted by Paul
Ekman with student nurses).
94. Livingstone Smith, supra note 5, at 75. As Livingstone Smith describes:
In an effort to quell the rising tide of anxiety, liars may automatically raise the pitch of
their voices, blush, perspire, scratch their noses, or make small movements with their
feet as though barely suppressing an impulse to flee. Alternatively, they may rigidly
control their voices, suppress any telltale stray movements, and raise suspicion by their
conspicuously wooden demeanors. Either way, our bodies seem to sabotage our minds’
best efforts at deceit.
Id.
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Effective deception under stress is notoriously ill fated, and never more so
than “when the perpetrator has to face a skeptical audience that is prepared to
penalize dishonesty.”95 Detection apprehension increases when the audience
has some expertise and may be tough to fool, and when the stakes involve
avoiding punishment not just for the original transgression but for the act of
deception itself.96 To lie to agents is thus a natural response but an uncalculated
risk. Once an investigation has proceeded to a confrontation with the target, she
has little opportunity to successfully derail the prosecution. The exchange will
generally be stylized and predictable, and transparent falsehoods that have no
impact on the course of the investigation are the most likely result.97
A. Efficiency
Practical considerations thus provide the most straightforward explanation
for the government’s reliance on false statements. Often, the basic scaffolding
of the evidence is largely in place when the interview occurs; agents do not
need confessions, nor are they fooled by denials. They would, however, find it
expedient either to obtain the interviewee’s cooperation or to have an easily
provable offense to charge as insurance for a conviction.98 This suits prosecutors’ institutional risk aversion and supplies two potential efficiencies: more
certain resolution of the existing case or advantageous substitution of a simpler
one. False statement charges also supply leverage to induce cooperation against
other defendants.
Furthermore, juries easily understand lying, and false statement charges
can simplify courtroom narratives. Deception is common on a crime scene, and
no less so in the context of street crime.99 Yet it is in white collar cases, where
the underlying misconduct can be tricky to prove in court, that deception is
typically charged as a freestanding crime. It can be difficult, for example, to
prove accounting fraud beyond a reasonable doubt, and focusing on criminal
deception makes a more straightforward appeal to the jury.100 In cases such as
95. Id. at 73 (“Under this kind of pressure, even the most determined con artist is likely to
get the jitters. Consequently, human liars tend to follow the example of Pinocchio and rat on
themselves by involuntary, nonverbal signs.”).
96. Paul Ekman & Mark G. Frank, Lies That Fail, in Lying and Deception, supra note
17, at 188–89.
97. For an overview of some of the common techniques of criminal interrogations, see,
e.g., Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation & Confessions (4th ed. 2001); see also
id. at 8 (noting that interrogations should be conducted “only when the investigator is reasonably
certain of the suspect’s guilt”).
98. As Ronald Gainer puts it: “Sometimes the operating philosophy seems to be that, if
the government cannot prosecute what it wishes to penalize, it will penalize what it can
prosecute.” Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 45, 63 n.19 (1998).
99. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 75 (“As any policeman will tell you, the answer to
‘Did you rob the bank, fire the shot, use the stolen credit cards, drink a bottle of scotch while
driving?’ is ‘No.’”).
100. See Abrams & Beale, supra note 42, at 756 (noting that the government has been
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public corruption prosecutions, where the elements are complicated to establish
and the jurisdictional issues can restrict charging options, § 1001 often provides
prosecutors with substitute offenses.101 It has also been widely used in the
context of cases classified by the Justice Department as terror-related. Among
those cases, charges for lying to the government are more common than
national security offenses.102 The statute thus functions as a lesser-included
offense, often in the absence of the necessary elements for a “greater” charge.
B. Authority
A more complicated explanation for the exercise of enforcement
discretion is that charges for defensive lying are a symbolic assertion of
government power, or of government entitlement to information as property.
Defendants risk exposure not only for fraudulent conduct, or active obstruction
to conceal it, but also for the failure to expedite investigations into their own
wrongdoing. The government seems to be enforcing a requirement that, even
though no statement can be compelled, any statement made must advance the
investigation.
Section 1001 originated with concerns about government property and
was passed as a response to Civil War procurement fraud. The predecessor of §
1001 is an 1863 statute prohibiting “false, fictitious, or fraudulent” claims
against the government.103 The statute was broadened in 1918 to cover statements made “for the purpose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or
defrauding the Government of the United States.”104 With the advent of the
New Deal in the 1930s, regulatory programs expanded and self-reporting grew
in importance. Information thus became equated with government property,
and the statute was no longer restricted to “cases involving pecuniary or
property loss to the government.”105 Rather than protect proprietary interests,

pursuing “ancillary charges like obstruction, perjury and false statements” in corporate fraud cases
and that it is “often much easier to prove such ancillary charges than to engage in a long drawn out
trial involving complex accounting and corporate business matters”).
101. See United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 814–19 (5th Cir. 1974) (charges arising from
IRS agent questioning without accompanying tax charges), abrogated by United States v.
Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 207 (D.
Md. 1955) (section 1001 indictment for denying charges of bribery, without bribery charges); see
also Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962), abrogated by Rodriguez-Rios, 14
F.3d 1040.
102. See Dan Eggen & Julie Tate, U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism
Charges, Wash. Post, June 12, 2005, at A1.
103. See Green, supra note 16, at 191–92.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941); see also Brogan v. United States,
522 U.S. 398, 412 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (explaining that § 1001 expanded during the
New Deal because false reports from regulated industries subverted government interests “even
though the Government would not be deprived of any property or money”). Stuart Green describes
the “hot oil frauds” against which the expanded statute was directed in Green, supra note 16, at
192 n.125.
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the statute now “has for its object the protection and welfare of the
government,”106 specifically the protection against “deceit, craft or trickery”
that will interfere with its functions.107
The origins of the statute are telling because, despite the passage of time,
the government’s perspective that it has a property interest in information
remains roughly the same. The government as victim in those early cases made
sense; society requires that the government protect its property and resources.
Whether the government is victimized by recent § 1001 offenses is a more
interesting question. Modern cases treat information itself as property, and
suggest that the refusal to cooperate is “theft by language” that is little different
from physical theft.108 The offense is now a hybrid of an institutional harm like
perjury and a proprietary harm like fraud, but with a stronger relationship to the
latter. False statements made in the context of civil discovery are rarely
prosecuted, despite their potential—and often potentially greater—impact on
judicial proceedings.109 “Information-gathering offenses” in the criminal context, however, theoretically defraud the government itself.110
When false statements mislead investigators, they can cause diffuse harm
to the integrity of government.111 The harm of a false statement that does not
disrupt an investigation is instead an affront to government authority,112 with
the government standing in as a victim of something akin to “honest services”
fraud, which imposes liability for disloyalty without any loss of tangible

106. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 n.8 (1987) (quoting Curley v. United
States, 130 F. 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1904)), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 7603(a), 102
Stat. 4508 (1988), as recognized in United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1304 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
107. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 359 n.8 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States,
265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
108. The concept of deception as “theft by language” is described in Jonathan D. Varat,
Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious Relationship,
53 UCLA L. Rev. 1107, 1113 (2006).
109. See Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 9, 35–
36 (2005).
110. See Norman Abrams, The New Ancillary Offenses, 1 Crim. L.F. 1, 17 (1989) (identifying an “enforcement and information-gathering” category of offenses that includes both false
statements that arise during an investigation and the failure to provide required information).
111. See 1 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law: Harm to Others 63–
64 (1984). As Feinberg explains:
Like community interests, governmental interests in the last analysis belong to
individual citizens. But the maintenance or advancement of a specific government
interest may be highly dilute in any given citizen’s personal hierarchy. I am not
seriously harmed by a single act of contempt of court or of tax evasion, though if such
acts became general, various government operations that are as essential to my welfare
as public health and economic prosperity would no longer be possible.
Id.; see also Murphy, supra note 25, at 1441 (noting the collective interest in the integrity of the
justice system “without regard to the effects to any particular victim or outcome of any single
case”).
112. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 1439 (questioning the propriety of the state’s interest in
“formalistic respect” as a basis of criminal liability).
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property.113 As with honest services fraud, the breadth of false statement
charges allows for easy exploitation without regard to the central concerns of
the offense.114 To extend the fraud analogy, the fiduciary obligation at issue is
to cooperate in an investigation against yourself.115 Erin Murphy has recently
identified a category of “obstinacy” charges, the substance of which “is nothing
other than the insult to the efficiency and authority of the state itself.”116 False
statements fit within that group. Investigations often involve a power struggle
between the government and suspects. Responding with silence when confronted leaves some control in the hands of defendants because it ordinarily requires
the government to prove the underlying charges. Once defendants speak, any
unsuccessful attempt at deception shifts the balance of power almost entirely to
the prosecution. At that point, the government can impose liability on the
defendant for “obstinacy” alone, or use the newly created crime to induce a
plea to the original misconduct.
False statement offenses involve not only deception but also disobedi117
ence. Although most criminal law requires forbearance or inaction, prosecuting defensive lies punishes the failure to act cooperatively and imports the
concept of contempt into the investigative context.118 Public conceptions of
legitimacy focus on procedural justice when the authorities “have imposed
themselves on a person” and contact with the authorities has not been “freely
chosen.”119 Process crimes generally do involve the government imposing itself
in the sense that it is approaching the subject and requiring the production of
evidence. The assertion of authority can be counterproductive because rather
than restoring public confidence in criminal justice institutions, prosecutions of
barely recognizable harm instead raise “ethical issues about the state’s power in
relation to the individuals on whose behalf it exercises power.”120 If there is
113. See Editorial, Martha Stewart Misgivings, Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A16 (quoting
U.S. Attorney’s statement that Martha Stewart was prosecuted to protect “the integrity of this
system”). On the victim of obstruction, compare United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100, 1104 (3d
Cir. 1988) (victim of contempt of court is the U.S. Attorney’s Office), with id. at 1107
(Mansmann, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should be viewed as the victim), cited in
Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1801, 1818 n.73 (1999).
114. See David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White
Collar Crime, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1398 (2008).
115. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 1452 (“The obligation of the obedient subject is to
facilitate the exercise of police power, even if the engines of that power are at the time trained on
running that same individual down.”).
116. Id. at 1449.
117. See id. at 1439.
118. Doug Husak has noted the similarity between information-gathering offenses and
common-law misprision of felony. See Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of
the Criminal Law 41 (2008). Stuart Green has also found the relationship between “contempt”
offenses and criminal lying telling. See Green, supra note 109, at 30 (noting the strand of
“defiance of governmental authority” in criminal deception).
119. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 83 (2006).
120. Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions 7 (2000). In his recent book, Louis Michael
Seidman also considers the perils of criminal laws that force action rather than requiring inaction.
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some doubt about the blameworthiness of this class of offenders, then the
criminal law may appear “not to reflect community notions of desert but rather
as a tool of a powerful government to intervene destructively in the lives of
ordinary people.”121
C. Apology
In addition to requiring cooperation, false statement cases are sometimes
resolved in part by forcing contrition. The desire for an appropriate apology
thus has some power to explain which cases prosecutors bring as well. Defendants may be punished not only for failing to confess and cooperate but also for
hesitating to offer a timely apology for the underlying conduct. There is precedent from the other end of the adjudicative process, in the Sentencing Guidelines themselves, for rewarding repentance and penalizing recalcitrance.122 The
“acceptance of responsibility” adjustment in the Guidelines turns in part on the
efficiency of forgoing a trial and on a defendant’s cooperation with the
government, but it chiefly emphasizes the defendant’s remorse.123
Pursuing false statements reflects broader cultural pressure to be honest
about transgressions.124 It both sanctions the defendant’s reluctance to accept
responsibility and brings about a public apology for the primary offense.
Apology can have a reintegrative effect, and there is renewed interest in the
restorative possibilities of alternative sanctions like shaming.125 Proponents of
restorative justice have explained that apologies promote harmony by offering
truth, breaking punitive cycles, and analyzing the original cause of discord.126
Apology asks forgiveness as a “symbolic corrective” and is “one means of
precluding or containing socially disruptive conflicts.”127 In recent years,
politicians, sports figures, entertainers, members of the clergy, university
presidents, and religious denominations have all offered apologies.128 Peter
See Louis Michael Seidman, Silence and Freedom 25 (2007) (analyzing Hubbel and
Schmerber’s theory).
121. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453,
482 (1997).
122. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(a) (2008).
123. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”:
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1507, 1524–26 (1997).
124. Cf. Pamela Druckerman, After the End of the Affair, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2008, at
A23 (“We Americans are particularly preoccupied with honesty. [Regarding infidelity, w]e’re the
only country that peddles the idea that ‘It’s not the sex, it’s the lying.’”).
125. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 Tex. L.
Rev. 2075 (2006).
126. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts, in 25 Crime & Justice: A Review of Research 1 (Michael Tonry ed., 1999).
127. Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation
34–35 (1991).
128. See Seidman, supra note 120, at 25 (citing examples of all of the above, as well as the
September 11 Commission hearings and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission as
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Brooks describes the importance of this social ritual:
[T]he imperative to ‘fess up, to take verbal responsibility for one’s
acts, is deeply ingrained in our culture, in our pedagogy, even in our
law. Children are daily told that they must confess to their misdeeds,
that confessing will be seen as possible grounds for mitigating
punishment, that the refusal to confess will on the contrary aggravate
the sanction, and—perhaps even worse—prevent reintegration into the
community of parental affection. Confession of wrongdoing is
considered fundamental to morality because it constitutes a verbal act
of self-recognition as wrongdoer and hence provides the basis of
rehabilitation. It is the precondition of the end to ostracism, reentry
into one’s desired place in the human community. To refuse confession is to be obdurate, hard of heart, resistant to amendment. Refusal
of confession can be taken as a defiance of one’s judges . . . whereas
confession allows those judges to pass their sentences in security,
knowing that the guilty party not only deserves and accepts but
perhaps in some sense wants punishment, as the penance that follows
confession.129
A sincere apology requires “remorseful acceptance of responsibility for
one’s wrongful and harmful actions, the repudiation of the aspects of one’s
character that generated the actions, the resolve to do one’s best to extirpate
those aspects of one’s character, and the resolve to atone or make amends.”130
Stephen Garvey has described how apology constitutes “the wrongdoer’s
public expression of his repentance, whereby he openly acknowledges his
wrongdoing and simultaneously disowns it.”131

examples of apology). Recall also some unconvincing apologies. On allegations that he lied about
performance-enhancing drugs in the 1990s, track star Ben Johnson stated: “I said I’m sorry. What
else can I say? I’ve lied and I admitted it. Life goes on.” Henry Alford, Op-Ed, Regrets Only, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 14, 2007, Week in Review, at 12. Or consider the even less apologetic Pete Rose in a
2004 comment on his betting scandal: “I’m sure that I’m supposed to act all sorry or sad or guilty
now that I’ve accepted that I’ve done something wrong. But you see, I’m just not built that way.”
Id.
129. Brooks, supra note 120, at 1–2 (noting the emphasis on President Clinton expressly
acknowledging that he had lied, without regard to his existing admissions of misconduct and other
expressions of contrition). See also Tavuchis, supra note 127, at 23. According to Tavuchis’s
description:
Something more is at stake in its genesis than the advantages sought in such social
maneuvers. . . . [A]n apology is an intricate set of speech acts that is evoked and
vivified by actions that challenge the putatatively secure achievements of membership
in a moral community. An apologizable breach thus constitutes a threat to such an order
and its accompanying definitions of reality that calls for the elimination of discrepancy
and uncertainty through unmediated confrontation.
Id.
130. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in Repentance: A
Comparative Perspective 143, 147 (Amitai Etizioni & David E. Carney eds., 1997).
131. Garvey, supra note 113, at 1815; see also id. at 1813 (“If a wrongdoer responds as he
should to his wrongdoing, he will feel guilt; and if he responds to his guilt as he should, he will
seek to set things right through the process of atonement.”).
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There is a sense, however, in which punishing defendants for the failure to
own up, and treating that failure as a lesser-included offense itself, is counterproductive to the goal of reintegration. The apology explanation may simply be
a subset of the authority thesis.132 We are not, and perhaps should not be,
entirely comfortable with those apologists who back into expressions of
remorse because of the leverage of the criminal law. An apology for the failure
to atone earlier seems somewhat removed from remorse for the wrongdoing
itself. Also, such an apology does not carry with it the same promise of mitigation or redemption. Bargained-for or manipulated confession may not have
much restorative power. Consider David Simon’s account of an interrogation as
“a carefully staged drama, a choreographed performance that allows a detective
and his suspect to find common ground where none exists.”133 In that “controlled purgatory,” Simon explains, “the guilty proclaim their malefactions,
though rarely in any form that allows for contrition or resembles an
unequivocal admission.”134 Seidman also sees contrition in the criminal justice
process as a complicated exchange:
The ultimate trade, then amounts to this: the victim gets to see the
perpetrator squirm before him and to feel magnanimous when he
exhibits mercy. The perpetrator, in turn, emerges from the encounter
with his ego bruised but otherwise unscathed. Needless to say, this
entire sadistic and masochistic dance has nothing to do with the
unbargained-for and umediated communication and connection that
apology’s advocates so admire. Instead it amounts to a complicated
and brutal struggle, with each side using the tools at hand to its
advantage.135
“Once the apology is in the public sphere,” Seidman emphasizes, “it inevitably
becomes entangled with questions of power.”136
Thus, the apology for a false statement may look more like stigmatizing
than reintegrative shaming, especially where offenders do not address the
underlying violation.137 Marion Jones, for example, cheated by using
132. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980) (defendant’s failure to
cooperate with the government indicates that he is unwilling “to shape up and change his
behavior,” and accordingly can be considered at his sentencing).
133. David Simon, Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets 206 (2006).
134. Id.; cf. Saul M. Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in
Investigative Interviewing: Rights, Research and Regulation 207, 220 (Tom Williamson
ed., 2006) (stating that the confessions that reach the public are comparable to a “Hollywood
drama—scripted by the police theory of the case, rehearsed during hours of unrecorded
questioning, directed by the questioner and ultimately enacted on paper, tape or camera by the
suspect”).
135. Seidman, supra note 120, at 44.
136. Id. at 39.
137. Nor, many skeptics argue, can repentance and reconciliation even be achieved in the
criminal justice system. As Abe Fortas stated: “Mea culpa belongs to a man and his God. It is a
plea that cannot be exacted from free men by human authority. To require it is to insist that the
state is the superior of the individuals who compose it, instead of their instrument.” Abe Fortas,
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performance-enhancing drugs in track and field and was then convicted under §
1001 for not confessing to it.138 After her conviction and sentencing, she made
no direct mention of her use of performance-enhancing drugs or her
involvement in a counterfeit check scheme, although those were the subjects of
the charged false statements. Instead, she acknowledged that “[m]aking these
false statements to federal agents was an incredibly stupid thing for me to do,
and I am responsible fully for my actions.”139 The statement, though presented
as repentance, notably failed to specify the actions for which she took
responsibility and thus had little reintegrative potential.
Broad application of the false statement statute may create efficiencies by
shortcutting some investigations and pleas, but it also increases the incidence of
trivial cases at the expense of more salient prosecutions. That “may ease the
burden for prosecutors,” but it also “dilutes the moral significance of a
successful prosecution.”140 The assertion of government authority through false
statement charges comes at a price as well because it may affect the legitimacy
of other criminal provisions.141 If many false statement prosecutions punish
offenses that do not necessarily cause harm and produce apology rituals that do
not have their intended social meaning, it is worth considering how courts and
legislatures might strike a better balance and safeguard against abuse.
III
IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL DISTORTIONS
The foregoing analysis provides some structure for evaluating the content
and posture of false statements and considering the motivations for prosecuting
them. It does not, however, address the obvious threshold question: why should
we care about defendants who attempt to deceive the government? The answer,
in part, is that these cases matter because they are within the realm of
borderline criminal activity where the moral authority of the criminal law has
its most significant effect,142 and where its messages should resonate clearly.

The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 Journal 95, 100 (Cleveland Bar
Ass’n 1954); see also Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!—Remorse, Apology, and Criminal
Sentencing, 38 Ariz. St. L.J. 371, 375–77 (2006).
138. See Mitch Albom, Marion Jones: The Needle, The Lying Done, Detroit Free Press,
Jan. 13, 2008, at 1B (suggesting that Jones will be imprisoned while Mark McGwire, Jose
Canseco, and Andy Pettitte (who have all either refused to testify or admitted steroid use) go free
because of her “hubris” in denying it so consistently).
139. See, e.g., Track Star Marion Jones Pleads Guilty to Doping Deception, CNN.com,
Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/10/05/jones.doping/index.html; see also Harvey
Araton, Blinded and Broken By Ambition, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2008, at D1 (Jones admitted in her
sentencing colloquy that she had made mistakes but identified those mistakes as the lies).
140. Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 1995, at
72, 77.
141. See Part III.B., infra.
142. Robinson & Darley, supra note 121, at 475 (“[A]s a matter of common sense, the
law’s moral credibility is not needed to tell a person that murder, rape, or robbery is wrong.”).
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Current enforcement strategies distort those signals and may undercut both the
consequentialist and retributive aims of criminal law.
The case for deterring defensive deception parallels in some respects
theories about regulation of social behavior via “broken windows” policing,
which focuses on public order offenses to prevent more serious crimes.143 It is
grounded in the argument that aggressive prosecution of harmless lies will
deter harmful ones, thereby reducing overall criminal behavior and encouraging
obedience to the law.144 As with curfews and graffiti ordinances, false
statement charges have a high ratio of violation to prosecution, and as with
other broken windows strategies, enforcers do not randomly select the targets
of order-maintenance policing.145
Strategically policing a deep technicality may enhance law and order, but
it may also trivialize sanctions more broadly and detract from the stigmatizing
effect of the law. Bill Stuntz has explained the collateral consequences of inattention to the salience of visible prosecutions:
If the most salient examples of political corruption involve cash bribes
in brown paper bags, the public will probably feel strongly about
corruption. If the most salient examples involve dialing from the
wrong telephone when soliciting campaign contributions, the public
reaction will probably be more tepid. That tepid reaction may affect
the public’s view of corruption more generally, may make it seem
more trivial than before. Perhaps that has something to do with the
different public reaction to the fund-raising scandals of the 1996
presidential campaign than to the Watergate scandal a generation
earlier. Criminal law expanded, the nature of marginal cases changed,
and attitudes toward what might be called “core” cases seemed to
change as well. Again, the story is of criminal law working against the
very norms it seeks to enforce.146
Similarly, because not everyone would condemn defensive lies, it may
dilute signals to comply to penalize them in cases where the wrongfulness of
the act covered up is not apparent, the societal interest in knowing about it is
minimal, and the cover-up itself is unsuccessful. Using false statement charges
in an effort to increase cooperation with the government may thus have the
byproduct of diminished clarity, credibility, and public trust.
143. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, Atlantic Monthly,
Mar. 1982, at 29, 29–31.
144. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken
Windows Policing 59–89 (2001). Some moral absolutists make arguments about lying that
parallel the theory of broken windows policing. Take, for example, St. Augustine’s exhortation to
avoid even the beneficial lie: “[L]ittle by little and bit by bit this evil will grow and by gradual
accession will slowly increase until it becomes such a mass of wicked lies that it will be utterly
impossible to find any means of resisting such a plague grown to huge proportions through small
additions.” Sullivan, supra note 5, at 62.
145. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 143.
146. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1886.
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A. Accountability Costs
That dilution effect results in part from the ease with which prosecutors
can deploy false statement charges as substitute offenses. Section 1001 opens a
particularly large gap between overbreadth and underenforcement. According
to Douglas Husak’s recent analysis of overcriminalization, discretion shifts
within the criminal justice system and settles in the place where it is least
visible, and unreviewable prosecutorial discretion governs the space between
actual and potential uses of the statute.147 The lack of accountability makes it
impossible to predict whether and when defendants will be indicted. Despite
stated policies against, for example, the prosecution of an “exculpatory no,”148
federal prosecutors do charge false statements in a broad range of cases.149 And
when some aspect of an investigation fails to bear fruit, or some evidentiary
problem exposes the government to trial risk, everyday lies in the course of the
investigation remain actionable.
Moreover, § 1001, as noted above, is part of a complex group of
overlapping statutes. The federal criminal code includes literally hundreds of
misrepresentation offenses, and prosecutors can rely on some provision to
punish any lie or even an “almost-but-not-quite” lie that “one might tell during
the course of any financial transaction or transaction involving the
government.”150 The concept of falsehood itself includes further prosecutorial
license because it encompasses reckless disregard for the truth,151 and it may
turn on contested interpretations of accounting standards and other professional
duties. The combination of an ambiguous offense like dishonesty and the
broad, vague statutes criminalizing it implicitly authorizes prosecutors to
classify inconvenient or otherwise undesirable interactions as criminal, and
there is little incentive to screen cases for worthy defendants.152 With narrow
147. Husak, supra note 118, at 21.
148. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 415 n.6 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (noting DOJ’s policy against charging a § 1001 “violation in situations in which a
suspect, during an investigation, merely denies guilt in response to questioning by the
government”) (quoting United States Attorneys’ Manual ¶ 9-42.160 (Sept. 1997)).
149. See, e.g., Patrick Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, Announcing Indictment of Lewis Libby,
Oct. 28, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
10/28/AR2005102801340.html (“We, as prosecutors and FBI agents, have to deal with false
statements, obstruction of justice and perjury all the time. The Department of Justice charges those
statutes all the time.”).
150. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505,
517 (2002).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2006) (reckless
disregard for the truth is tantamount to knowing falsehood under § 1001).
152. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons
from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 165, 179–81
(2004) (explaining that the prosecutor “first interprets statutory language when determining
whether the statute covers the conduct at issue,” and that pattern “leads to an incremental, but
inexorable, expansion of the laws” and allows charges for such offenses as Stewart’s public
assertion of her innocence); see also Stuntz, supra note 150, at 571 (“That makes the prosecutor
the effective adjudicator of the fraud offense—and if she adjudicates badly, the legal system will
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proof requirements and a rate of disposition by plea agreement approaching 97
percent, the false statement offense provides a low-visibility charging option.153
As Richman and Stuntz have described in political economic terms,
strategic enforcement diminishes deterrence when penalties are not “publicly
and transparently attributed to the crimes that prompt . . . prosecutions.”154
Targeting defendants for one crime while prosecuting them for another
ultimately can “undermine faith in the criminal justice system as a whole, thus
encouraging the view that ‘beating the system’ is neither immoral nor
antisocial.”155 Furthermore, the pursuit of unsuccessful obstruction, like that of
Enron accounting firm Arthur Andersen or Martha Stewart, when it is the only
misconduct left standing in a case, signals nothing useful about the primary
norms concerning accounting failures or insider trading.156 The untested theory
of securities fraud for which Stewart originally was targeted was never
adjudicated.157 When Marion Jones was sentenced for lying about using
impose no penalty on her.”).
153. The plea rate for offenses categorized as “false statements” in 2008 was 96.6 percent,
which is consistent with the overall percentage of plea bargaining in the federal system. See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online,
Table 5.24.2008, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242008.pdf.
154. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583, 631 (2005); see also id. at
586–87. Richman and Stuntz assert:
[T]he political economy of criminal law enforcement depends on a reasonably good
match between the charges that motivate prosecution and the charges that appear on
defendants’ rap sheets. When crimes and charges do not coincide, no one can tell
whether law enforcers are doing their jobs. The justice system loses the credibility it
needs, and voters lose the trust they need to have in the justice system.
Id.
155. O’Sullivan, supra note 30, at 676. And where a retributive rationale is lacking along
with transparency, the public experiences generalized discomfort about government methods
without some “segregable and visible ‘bad’ law to blame,” as there was, for example, in the case
of Prohibition. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 121, at 484. Without such a specific source,
“the observer can do little other than be suspicious of the entire enterprise.” Id.
156. As Steven Bainbridge observed:
I find something Star Chamber-ish about the Quattrone conviction, just as I did with
respect to the earlier Martha Stewart conviction. In neither case did the government
indict the defendant with respect to the alleged underlying violations. Instead, both
were indicted for subsequent acts that allegedly obstructed the investigation. Yet, if that
investigation did not result in charges, it seems vindictive to charge obstruction
(especially since in neither case was the obstruction very successful in interfering with
the investigation).
Steven Bainbridge, Quattrone Conviction, ProfessorBainbridge.com (May 3, 2004, 5:00 PM)
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=119.
157. See Moohr, supra note 152, at 215 n.182. Moohr asserts:
Despite Arthur Andersen’s conviction for obstructing justice, accountants may still not
understand the standard for assessing an accounting firm’s criminal liability when it
fails to discover or aids a client’s deception about its actual financial condition. The
conviction of Martha Stewart for lying to investigators suggests that the underlying
conduct—selling stock on the basis of some kind of nonpublic information—was
criminal. But because that offense was not charged and tried, those in a position to
violate insider trading regulations are not able to determine whether a prospective trade
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performance-enhancing drugs, the judge’s statement suggested that he
remained concerned primarily about Jones’s cheating, rather than the false
statement for which he sentenced her to six months of imprisonment. “Athletes
in society have an elevated status,” he said. “They entertain, they inspire and
perhaps most importantly, they serve as role models for kids around the world.
When there is this widespread level of cheating, it sends all the wrong
messages to those who follow these athletes’ every move.”158 Yet we have seen
how the offense itself, and Jones’s public acceptance of responsibility for it,
emphasized lies to federal agents in the investigation rather than the cheating or
the years she spent publicly denying it. Other celebrity athletes have likewise
faced charges concerning their words rather than their conduct, even though the
federal focus on steroid abuse among professional athletes has been justified by
concerns about the “integrity of competition,” “general public health,” the dangers of steroid abuse by children, and the health of the athletes themselves.159
In the 2008 sentencing proceeding for cyclist Tammy Thomas after her
conviction for false statements concerning steroid use, Judge Susan Ilston
concluded that prison time would be excessive when the “underlying
miscreants” who had distributed the steroids all received lesser sentences.160
Similarly, the “real crime” in Brogan involved fraud on the defendant’s union,
but “it was enough to prove that Brogan denied something embarrassing in a
brief conversation with a federal agent.”161
Although some scholars have identified pretextual charging as a
legitimate use of the range of process crimes,162 that view overlooks the
wholesale problem of opacity in white collar enforcement. Pretextual charges
against notorious defendants like Al Capone find some support in a retributive
rationale, but expressive considerations may cut the other way.163 Broad
based in similar circumstances violates insider trading law.
Id.
158. Lynn Zinser, Six-Month Sentence for Jones Meant to Be Message, N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 2008, at D3. The judge did state as well that he wanted “people to think twice before lying”
and to “realize that no one is above the law.” Id.
159. See Paul H. Haagen, The Players Have Lost That Argument: Doping, Drug Testing,
and Collective Bargaining, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 831, 833, 843 (2006).
160. Carol Pogash & Michael S. Schmidt, Cyclist Avoids Prison Time, Which May Benefit
Bonds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2008, at D6.
161. Stuntz, supra note 150, at 571.
162. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 25, at 1444 (“An obstruction statute that authorizes a
life sentence may seem reasonable, especially if the obstruction involved harm to a person. A
crime that carries the stigma and the sentencing range of a serious felony conviction therefore
offers an attractive vehicle for achieving a significant ultimate sanction in a pretextual context.”);
cf. Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1526, 1553 (2008)
(suggesting that overbreadth in federal criminal law such as the fraud prohibitions might provide
the necessary tools to deal with “sanction-resistant violator[s]” and “inventive and resourceful
persons determined to appropriate the interests of others”).
163. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295, 1297 (2001). Brown underscores the expressive
considerations:
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charging strategies also raise a retail-level problem by capturing defendants
who tell harmless and predictable lies about ill-defined underlying misconduct.164 The lack of accountability mutes deterrent signals, and this
perceived lack of fairness further undercuts legitimacy and therefore the
“system’s ability to command obedience.”165
B. Expressive Consequences
It is not merely that the public cannot see the underlying wrong or hold
prosecutors accountable for strategic charges, but also that what is visible may
not be considered harmful. If that is so, then the prosecution of harmless selfpreserving falsehoods not only hazards prosecutorial abuse but also could
undermine broader norms governing substantive misconduct.166
Recently, many criminal law scholars have turned their attention to the
interaction between law and social norms, the earned credibility of the code,
and the expressive or signaling function of the criminal justice system.167 Their
work finds support in social science demonstrating that voluntary compliance

Criminal law’s expressive and retributive functions sometimes conflict because
punitive approaches alienate offenders, reduce cooperation toward compliance, and
may damage the legitimacy of law that is important for deterrence. Even when morally
justified, retributivist sanctions can harm prevention efforts and reduce voluntary
compliance. Faced with that irony, we sometimes decide to forgo prosecution of
offenders for whom we have affirmative, justifying reasons to punish.
Id.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Haziness
designed to avoid loopholes through which bad persons can wriggle can impose high costs on
people the statute was not designed to catch.”).
165. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
781, 797 (2006).
166. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1886 (noting that prosecuting marginal misbehavior
undermines the norms that define good behavior, specifically that “white collar crime is likely to
come to seem increasingly trivial as the laws forbidding it become increasingly broad”); Gerard E.
Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 23, 47 (1997) (“Both in justice to those . . . labeled [as criminal], and to preserve the
always-threatened moral capital of the criminal law from dilution, conviction of crime must
ordinarily be reserved for those who violate deeply held and broadly agreed social norms.”).
167. Paul Robinson and John Darley, for example, illuminate the link between retributive
norms and the moral credibility of criminal prohibitions. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 121,
at 475–76 (analyzing the “connection between perceptions of the law’s moral credibility and
obedience to the law”). See also generally Bernard E. Harcourt, After the “Social Meaning Turn”:
Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy
Analysis, 34 Law & Soc’y Rev. 1 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62
U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 2021, 2031 (1996); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 150, at 520 n.73 (collecting
citations to recent work on law and norms). For critical treatments of the focus on social meaning,
see, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1363, 1374–75 (2000); Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of
Criminal Law Scholarship, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 467, 489–95 (2003).
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flows from the sense that the law is just and the governing body legitimate.168
Paul Robinson, in particular, has emphasized the danger that overbroad crimes
can pose to the credibility of the criminal law. He concludes that:
Expanding the criminal law beyond the bounds of perceived desert
initially weakens the stigmatizing effect that that expansion seeks to
enlist. Finally, it destroys the stigmatizing effect; criminal penalties for
non-condemnable conduct cause the public to sympathize with the
person charged, and to despise the legal system that brings the charge.
And it is the credibility of the criminal law in general that may be
destroyed. Criminal conviction for a violation that the community sees
as non-condemnable conduct affects not just the meaning of liability
imposed for those offenses but the condemnatory message for all
criminal convictions.169
Robinson has also argued that retributive philosophy should incorporate
lay views of justice and that utilitarian analysis should account for the influence
of lay tastes.170 In order to harness “personal moral commitment and the power
of social disapproval,” criminal law must align with societal norms.171
168. See Tyler, supra note 119, at 65 (“This high level of normative commitment to
obeying the law offers an important basis for the effective exercise of authority by legal officials.
People clearly have a strong predisposition toward following the law. If authorities can tap into
such feelings, their decisions will be more widely followed.”); id. at 24 (“The suggestion that
citizens will voluntarily act against their self-interest is the key to the social value of normative
influences.”); see also Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of
Retributive Justice, in 40 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 193, 235 (Mark P.
Zanna ed., 2008) (“The ‘rule of law’ is threatened when the rules of law violate citizen
intuition.”); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy, and Law Enforcement, 79 Or. L. Rev. 391
(2000) (regression analysis about the sources of compliance); Paul H. Robinson, Structure
and Function in Criminal Law 194–95 (1997) (“Behavioural science research suggests that
people better understand rules that mirror their own intuitive judgments about assessing liability. .
. . [A] code of conduct inspires greater compliance if, in the public’s view, it describes conduct
that the public sees as wrongful.”).
169. Robinson & Darley, supra note 121, at 482; see also id. at 481 (“With each additional
non-blameworthy use, the meaning of ‘criminal liability’ becomes incrementally less tied to
blameworthiness and incrementally less able to evoke condemnation.”).
170. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 Cambridge L.J. 145 (2008). On the retributivist perspective, see
Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 91 (1997)
(setting forth a leading modern statement of the retributivist theory of punishment, claiming that
“[w]e are justified in punishing because and only because offenders deserve it”); Garvey, supra
note 113, at 1823 (“[A] wrongdoer’s punishment should be proportional to his desert, which is
typically thought to be some function of the wrong he did and the culpability with which he did
it.”). Utilitarian theories of deterrence counsel in favor of a norms/crimes alignment as well. The
economic perspective on the signaling function is that people observe criminal prohibitions
instrumentally because they are “likely to obtain future returns when others see them as obeying a
legitimate law.” Eric Posner, Law & Social Norms 111 (2000); see also Jack Knight, Social
Norms and the Rule of Law: Fostering Trust in a Socially Diverse Society, in Trust in Society
354, 354–65 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of
Punishment?, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 516–17 (1987).
171. Robinson, supra note 140, at 76 (stating that “criminal law must be seen by the
potential offender and by the potential offender’s social group as an authoritative source of what is
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Although morality is but one source of the criminal law’s credibility, it
functions best when it imposes requirements perceived as just and punishes
those deemed deserving.172 Stuart Green has drawn a similar connection
between public perceptions of morality and the authority of the criminal label.
He observes that “when there is a gap between what the law regards as morally
wrongful and what a significant segment of society views as such, moral
conflict and ambiguity are likely to be the result.”173 Crude boundaries can
diminish the “informational influence” of the law and thus its power to bring
about law-abiding behavior.174
With regard to fraud and deception offenses, the legitimacy of the fine
line-drawing that enforcers do is particularly significant. Shifting the focus to
social psychology gives a better sense of the problem. Some white collar
prohibitions are counterintuitive, but individuals will follow the law reflexively
if they view its source as authoritative and reliable.175 This operates, for
example, as follows:
Without knowing quite why insider trading is morally wrong, most of
us accept the conclusion that it is wrong, because the relevant authorities have thought about it, and assert that it is wrong. It is what we all
count on when, as we travel down a highway that is new to us, we
slow down when we see a sign saying “caution, blind curve,” and
count on others to slow down as well. It is, in one sense, blind
obedience, but it is extremely socially useful, and it functions based on
attitudes of trust toward the source, in turn based on past experiences
of the source providing credible messages.176
Where criminality itself is in question, as it often is in § 1001 cases, the
credibility of authorities is essential to compliance. And the preference-shaping

moral, of what is right—much as, within a functional family, a parent may be seen as such an
authoritative source”).
172. But see Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Thory 109
(1999). Posner explains:
[M]uch of the conduct to which the law does attach sanctions is morally indifferent,
such as fixing prices, trading securities on inside information, hiring an illegal alien
when no one else is available to do the work, driving with your seat belt unfastened,
breaking a contract involuntarily, and inflicting unavoidable injury in the course of a
hazardous but socially necessary activity.
Id.
173. Green, supra note 38, at 46 (citing, inter alia, Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 404–05, 422 (1958) (emphasizing that criminal
sanctions can only be justified if accompanied by “the judgment of community condemnation”)).
174. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame 202
(1995).
175. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2007) (the source of the criminal law
must be “legitimate in its authority, expert in its knowledge, and trustworthy in its motives”)
(citing Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and
Contemporary Approaches 62–69 (1996)).
176. Id. at 30.
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at which white collar prosecutions often aim is most effective when
enforcement promotes public trust.177
Tom Tyler’s empirical work underscores this relationship between
credibility and compliance. Social psychologists regard normative bases for
compliance as more powerful than instrumental ones, and Tyler has concluded
that the “most important normative influence on compliance with the law is the
person’s assessment that following the law accords with his or her sense of
right and wrong.”178 Although this morality-based motivation has power,
“legitimacy-based” forces are even more stable,179 and Tyler has also
documented the importance of procedural justice to public acceptance of legal
rules.180
There is thus strong social scientific support for the general proposition
that divergence between commonsense views of justice and the conduct of
enforcers diminishes compliance. But now we come to the rather more difficult
question whether there are sophisticated and stable consensus views about
harmless investigative lies and whether we can identify and account for them.
The harm caused by an offense does factor into public perceptions of its
seriousness.181 Clinical assessments of the blameworthiness of offenses can be
highly nuanced, and controlled experiments on the grading of offenses record
perceptions of the resulting harm.182 Whether the public actually perceives
177. See Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90
Calif. L. Rev. 1513, 1519–20, 1538 (2002) (noting the relationship between public trust and
regulatory outcomes); Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 959,
966–67 (2008) (a “critical facet of the relationship of trust that sustains the rule of law is the
confidence of the governed that the fidelity of their governors” to rule-of-law values “does not
result in law that the governed do not recognize as their own”); id. at 964 (rule of law is based on
political trust between the government and the governed) (citing Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo,
Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Court 204,
204–208 (2002) (effective legal regulation depends on “the public’s trust in the motives of legal
authorities”)).
178. Tyler, supra note 119, at 64. Tyler’s seminal Chicago study illustrated the central
role that the blameworthiness of an offense plays in predicted peer attitudes about crime. Violating
laws directed at conduct that appears harmless is not expected to provoke much criticism, and
those laws are thus less likely to be obeyed.
179. See id. at 57–64 (summarizing regressions indicating that personal morality strongly
correlated with compliance, and that legitimacy, though more weakly correlated, was still five
times more likely than deterrence to stimulate compliance).
180. See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 231, 239 (2008)
(“[L]egitimacy develops from the manner in which authority is exercised.”) (citing Max Weber,
Economy and Society (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans.,
1968)).
181. See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal
Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 55 (1997) (“[P]ublic conceptions of seriousness emphasize the
consequences of the crime and the harm done, rather than the offender’s intent or the potential for
harm.”).
182. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of
Justice, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1829, 1832–46 (2007) (setting forth empirical research on sophisticat-
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harm in defensive lying may be particularly challenging to assess. Sound bites
are not experiments, and the messages the public receives from a decentralized
media are not uniform. ESPN viewers have one set of opinions on the Marion
Jones case, regular watchers of Martha Stewart Living considered her
prosecution in the light of her celebrity, and perceptions of President Clinton’s
perjury and Scooter Libby’s obstruction turn in part on whether signals about
those cases were received from MSNBC, CNN, or Fox News. It is thus possible
that even though there are fine-grained moral norms about defensive lying, they
are not widely shared.
Although the content of community views is methodologically complicated to access,183 several telling signs of a disjunction between those views
and the conduct of law enforcement warrant further exploration.184 What
follows is admittedly either anecdotal or extrapolated from theory in other
realms, but the available impressionistic evidence is a starting point.185 Lying in
response to an accusation is among the most ordinary of human failings.186
While there may be a widely held belief about the wrongfulness of lying in
general, there is no consensus about the social harmfulness of defensive
deception. One could argue that broad legal condemnation of deception tracks
the moral code in the abstract and comports with “deontological desert” at a
transcendent level.187 But some philosophers stop short of categorically
condemning dishonesty and recognize the context-based nature of lies,
particularly in confrontations with authority.188 Utilitarians, for example, “see
ed, and widely shared, grading of offenses by laypersons).
183. See Christopher Slobogin, Foreword: Is Justice Just Us?, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 601,
609 (“Even if [divining the content of the community’s views accurately] is achieved, a consensus
among the citizenry may not emerge, or any consensus that does surface may stem from common
misimpressions about crime and the legal system, rather than informed judgments.”); see also
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1537, 1540 (2000); see
also Robinson & Darley, supra note 175, at 8 (“[C]ulturally shared judgments of the relative
blameworthiness of different acts of wrongdoing are commonly intuitive rather than reasoned
judgments.”).
184. In a future project, I intend to supplement the non-empirical analysis here with
structured interviews and survey data that will explore both insider understanding and public
perceptions of the harm caused by different categories of investigative lies.
185. See, e.g., Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 Duke L.J. 1215, 1246
(2004) (“[I]mpressionistic evidence—though unreliable in general—may be conveying at least
some real information . . . .”).
186. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1227, 1229
(1988) (proffering an excuse rationale for the privilege against self-incrimination on the theory
that confessions to criminal conduct, while perhaps the “right” thing to do, “require more courage
and integrity than most of us possess”); see also id. at 1242–80 (arguing that self-preserving lies
are among the most human of frailties and do not merit punishment).
187. Philosophers from Aquinas to Kant to Bok have theorized that lying is always morally
wrong and that truth is a “categorical imperative.” See Bok, supra note 18; Immanuel Kant, On
the Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in Ethics 280 (Peter Singer ed., 1994); see also
Fried, supra note 16 (arguing that lying is an inherent wrong).
188. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 61; see also, e.g., Green, supra note 109, at 14–16
(wrongful inculpation is more harmful than wrongful exculpation).
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deception by itself as morally neutral and judge it entirely by its
consequences.”189 Some religious thinkers also classify lies “according to
underlying motive and effect on those lied to and on society in general, and
according to the corresponding degree of moral failure or sinfulness.”190 Even
the absolutists like St. Augustine assign degrees of severity to lying, with the
lie “harmful to no one” low on the scale, albeit a sin.191
It is not, moreover, moral philosophy that sets norms, but rather community standards of correctness that do so. And harsh legal treatment of defensive
deception may not reflect a widely internalized sense of duty to the
government.192 To this extent, I disagree with Stuart Green’s premise that false
statements involve “obviously harmful or risk-producing conduct”193 and that
they are “uncontroversially subject to criminal sanctions”194 in the same way
that perjury and fraud are. Because everyone tells lies occasionally, context
matters when evaluating their impact. Although it is noble to take responsibility
for serious misconduct, there is a countervailing norm concerning the right to
self-preservation. It is the ordinary course that individuals “not only fail to do
the virtuous thing but actually compound their wrongdoing by attempting to
conceal it.”195 One could plausibly argue that organic, defensive lies are
excusable, and that many reasonable people would lie under the same
circumstances. While the defendant’s conduct is wrong, “the harm the conduct
causes in any one case is both slight and diffuse while the pressure is both
substantial and concentrated.”196 Collective intuition thus holds that “there is
something potentially unfair about making it a crime for one suspected of
criminal activity to shield himself from government scrutiny.”197 There is a
strong positive norm favoring contrition and personal responsibility, but the
duty to cooperate with the government against yourself is at best a “sticky
norm” about which there is significant ambivalence.

189. Sullivan, supra note 5, at 61.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 62.
192. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as “informal social regularities that individuals
feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external nonlegal sanctions, or both”).
193. Green, supra note 16, at 159.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 172–73. But see Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980) (the “deeply
rooted social obligation [to cooperate] is not diminished when the witness to crime is involved in
illicit activities himself” and accordingly the failure to assist the government in an investigation is
a legitimate consideration at sentencing).
196. Stuntz, supra note 186, at 1254 (suggesting that there is a classic excuse rationale
applicable in the slightly different context of self-protective perjury, which “looks a good deal like
the commission of any victimless crime under great pressure”).
197. Green, supra note 109, at 33; see also R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and
Constitutional Right, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 15, 29 (1981) (identifying a “right to avoid very
destructive consequences to [oneself] even if submission would serve the welfare of others”).
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To support these theoretical accounts of a divide between informal rules
and the formal crime of defensive deception, anecdotal evidence suggests that
some defendants have avoided the normative pressures classically associated
with punishment. These social punishments include “commitment costs” that
put past accomplishments in jeopardy, “attachment costs” that cause the loss of
valued relationships, and the “stigma” of discredit in the eyes of others.198 In
Martha Stewart’s case, for example, her brand has endured, and her company’s
stock price nearly tripled during her incarceration.199 Marion Jones’s fan base
has long since eroded, and she forfeited her five Olympic medals, but that
occurred because natural speed did not propel all of her achievements, not
because she resisted confessing to federal agents. Many believe that President
Clinton survived impeachment with high approval ratings in part because his
“apparent falsehoods came in the form of false denials made ‘defensively,’ in
response to specific questions put to him, rather than ‘offensively,’ on his own
initiative.”200 And some baseball fans have begun to demonstrate fatigue with
the assemblage of athletes implicated in steroid use and then investigated for
false statements.201 Public response to these cases provides further evidence
that norms may not track the broadest applications of the crime, and that the
social meaning of these cases may be rather different from the government’s
intended message.
C. Backfire Effects
To the extent there is a divide between norms and crimes, it can affect
both general compliance (by trivializing criminality)202 and specific compliance

198. Robinson & Darley, supra note 121, at 469.
199. Keith Naughton, Martha Breaks Out, Newsweek, Mar. 7, 2005, at 36; Richard
Siklos, Stewart’s Next Big Project: Justifying Her Investors’ Expectations, N.Y. Times, July 18,
2005, at C1; cf. Schroeder, supra note 50, at 2023 (“[I]t is far from clear whether Stewart’s trades
were unlawful, let alone illegal, and it is hard to identify any harm her acts directly caused
anyone.”).
200. Green, supra note 16, at 162.
201. Reactions to Alex Rodriguez’s acknowledgment that he concealed steroid use—and
the 2009 revelations that several players, including Manny Ramirez and David Ortiz, tested
positive for steroid use in a 2003 screen—have been muted in contrast to the erosion of Barry
Bonds’s fan support in response to his steroid use and obstruction indictment. See, e.g., Bill
Shaikin, On Baseball: Game (not) Over for Gagne, L.A. Times, July 5, 2009, at D1 (“What was
once a national outrage over baseball’s steroid era has evolved into a national fatigue.”).
202. See, e.g., Husak, supra note 118, at 12 (“The state cannot effectively stigmatize
persons for engaging in conduct that few condemn and most everyone performs.”); Stuart P.
Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533, 1536 (1997) (“[A]pplying criminal
sanctions to morally neutral conduct is both unjust and counterproductive. It unfairly brands
defendants as criminals, weakens the moral authority of the sanction, and ultimately renders the
penalty ineffective.”); Robinson & Darley, supra note 175, at 21 (stigmatization controls conduct
far more efficiently than the criminal justice system, but it occurs only when legal codes
accurately represent “moral condemnation from the community’s point of view”); Stuntz, supra
note 4, at 1894 (“The more ‘crime’ includes things that only a slight majority of the population
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(by signaling widespread deception). Allowing for prosecutions in the absence
of harm and without accompanying social stigma may produce a variety of
counterproductive effects. The theory of “broken windows” policing of
technical lies—and the idea that punishing some harmless lies will deter more
harmful ones—is undercut by experience and recent social science.
Janice Nadler has conducted experiments supporting the “flouting thesis,”
according to which the perceived illegitimacy of one legal outcome negatively
impacts people’s willingness to comply with unrelated laws. Nadler exposed a
group of undergraduates to mock newspaper stories designed to elicit a perception that the laws described were either just or unjust and then administered a
criminal behavior survey testing their willingness to engage in drunk driving,
tax evasion, speeding, illegal parking, underage drinking, and minor thefts. The
participants who had been exposed to unjust laws demonstrated, across the
board, a greater likelihood of committing these crimes. “When a person evaluates particular legal rules, decisions, or practices as unjust,” Nadler concluded,
“the diminished respect for the legal system that follows can destabilize
otherwise law-abiding behavior.”203 If prosecutors are perceived as pressing an
unfair advantage from the broad terms of the statute, creating crimes during
strategic interviews, and overcharging to induce a plea by defendants not
otherwise guilty, then the enforcement strategy may produce a net loss of
compliance.
Nadler further observes that “the expressive power of law can backfire
when a law inadvertently generates disrespect,” for example by sending a
message that everyone cheats on taxes.204 Dan Kahan has noted as well that “a
person’s beliefs about whether other persons in her situation are paying their
taxes plays a much more significant role in her decision to comply than does
the burden of the tax or her perception of the expected punishment for
evasion.”205 Similarly, athlete-doping scandals created the widespread perception that drug use was the norm and necessary to compete. To signal that lying
to the government is the standard response to an investigative inquiry may also
decrease cooperation, or at least undermine the norm in its favor.206 This

thinks is bad, the harder it is to sell the idea that ‘criminal’ is a label that only attaches to very bad
people.”).
203. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1399, 1401 (2005).
204. Id. at 1402 (citing Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev.
333, 342 (2001)); see also Emanuela Carbonara, Francesco Parisi & Georg von Wangenheim,
Unjust Laws and Illegal Norms, (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-02, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088742 (explaining that social opposition to unjust laws may trigger
social norms with countervailing effects on legal intervention and citing the example of increased
sanctions against copyright infringers and music downloaders in the U.S.).
205. See Kahan, supra note 167, at 354–56 (summarizing empirical, statistical, and
experimental studies of the role of social influence on law-breaking).
206. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1882 (noting that broader criminalization of lying has not
led to stronger norms against lying and citing “the common perception that politicians lie
constantly, notwithstanding that politicians’ lies are among those most commonly covered by
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problem is particularly acute with offenses that derive what social stigma they
carry from criminalization and not from more entrenched norms such as those
against violence.207 Moreover, trivial cases necessarily draw resources from
more salient prosecutions of deception and obstruction that could enhance
compliance.208
Another sort of backfire effect may be at work too, in the form of what
Darryl Brown has called “the psychology of resentment.”209 Resentful
offenders, Brown explains, “are not likely to experience punishment [or the
threat of punishment] as virtue-inculcating experiences,” and a command-andcontrol approach to cooperation may have the same anticompliance effect that
it does with regard to regulation.210 If prosecutors deploy false statement
charges selectively and strategically, they also risk the perception of differential
enforcement, which may itself “breed[] resentment.”211 In another illustration,
researchers have documented an increase in file sharing after music companies
started suing users of peer-to-peer technology for illegal music downloading.212
When the expressive power of the law is not very strong, a sudden increase in
the strictness of the law may lead to countervailing effects.213 Deep deterrence
of a relatively harmless technical offense can make the odds of escaping
detection appear high (because of its perceived prevalence) and render the
stigma of criminality low.214
Furthermore, aggressive enforcement can have an anticooperative impact
on bystanders. Witnesses who have no exposure to liability may cooperate less
for fear of running afoul of § 1001. This is true of “bystanders” in the corporate
criminal codes”).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 142–46 (discussing the importance of prosecuting
the most salient examples of white collar crime).
208. See Buell, supra note 162, at 1525 (“In game-theoretic terms, salient enforcement
action against the most determined defectors maintains the belief among those inclined to
cooperate in conditions of reciprocity that others who are similarly inclined, and who have
observed the same enforcement action, can be expected to continue to cooperate rather than
defect.”). On the power of social influence, see also Richard H. McAdams, supra note 192, at 355
(law can give rise to norms that induce compliance).
209. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295, 1313–14 (2001).
210. See Darryl K. Brown, What Virtue Ethics Can Do for Criminal Justice: A Reply to
Huigens, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 29, 37 (2002).
211. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1795 & 1835
(1998).
212. See Ville Oksanen & Mikko Valimaki, Theory of Deterrence and Individual
Behavior: Can Lawsuits Control File Sharing on the Internet?, 3 Rev. L. & Econ. 693 (2007).
213. See Carbonara, Parisi & von Wangenheim, supra note 204, at 5, 23 (subsequent
softening of deterrence can thus actually increase compliance by allowing a gradual
internalization of the law’s aim).
214. See Kahan, supra note 167, at 394–95 (severity and certainty are not, as the standard
economic rationale would have it, interchangeable; rather, substituting severity for certainty can
diminish social influence against criminality); cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968) (deterrent force stems from the combination of
the probability of detection and the severity of sanction).
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setting as well. When the government prosecutes minimizing misstatements
that employees make to their own corporate counsel, it compromises its longterm ability to share the fruits of productive internal investigations.215 As a
result, an offense that is supposed to protect the government’s access to
information ultimately produces less of it.216 In addition, a single-minded focus
on the secondary norm against defensive deception can distract investigators
and prosecutors from effectively enforcing the primary norm (against, for
example the use of steroids, creative accounting, or government corruption).217
IV
ANIMATING MATERIALITY
In light of this account of the expressive harms and unintended
consequences that may flow from false statement prosecutions, the prescriptive
possibilities of improved line-drawing merit some analysis. As a general
matter, innocence in white collar cases is not factual but turns on an argument
that the defendant did nothing wrong. The definition of crime tends to
dominate, particularly with regard to offenses like false statements. They are
neither patently wrongful nor strict liability regulatory offenses, different in
kind from a violent crime but not in the mattress-tag-tearing category either.218
One could credibly argue that all deception is wrongful, but there is substantial
disagreement as to how wrongful,219 and thus a need for objective rather than
subjective “tool[s] for separating the few cases where prosecution is
appropriate from the many where it isn’t.”220
215. See Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The DOJ Risks Killing the Golden Goose Through
Computer Associates/Singleton Theories of Obstruction, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1447, 1472
(2007).
216. Editorial, Martha Stewart Misgivings, Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A16 (Stewart
case provides “a huge new incentive for CEOs to clam up the next time the feds ask questions”);
Albom, supra note 138, at 1B (what we’ve learned from the Marion Jones case is to “choose lies
carefully and stay away from the feds”); see also Tyler & Fagan, supra note 180, at 235
(explaining that the feeling of obligation to obey the law and to defer to the decisions made by
legal authorities not only encourages compliance with the law but also motivates cooperation with
law enforcement).
217. In the steroids investigation, for example, Brian McNamee has thus far avoided
prosecution for steroid distribution by providing evidence of Roger Clemens’s false statements
about his own steroid use. Likewise, Patrick Arnold, Greg Anderson, and Angel Heredia, who
distributed steroids through BALCO, all received cooperation deals that resulted in lesser
sentences than those received by the athletes who lied about being their clients. See Pogash &
Schmidt, supra note 160, at D6; Lance Williams & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Short Prison Terms for
BALCO Defendants, S.F. Chron., Oct. 19, 2005, at A1; see also Sanchirico, supra note 185, at
1316 (explaining that the law of evidence tampering is “an area where the goal of finding truth ex
post is a poor proxy for the goal of shaping truth ex ante”).
218. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 154, at 589–90 (noting the “in-between quality”
that offenses like false statements have).
219. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 65 (“Personality, morality, religious upbringing, view
of the world—all enter into one’s sense of right or wrong and influence judgment on whether or
not a lie is deplorable, forgivable, or even laudable.”).
220. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 154, at 590.
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Section 1001’s broad conduct rule—“do not lie the government”—sends a
useful message to the public, but it also gives free reign to the discretionary
power of prosecutors. This is an instance where the decision rule addressed to
officials ought to differ in content—by accounting for the investigative significance of the falsehood—to mitigate the potential for abuse of power.221
A.Restrictive Judicial Interpretation
The vague wording of § 1001 and the judiciary’s failure to clarify it
through interpretation make it susceptible to manipulation. This pushing of “the
substantive envelope” is, in Erin Murphy’s terms, one more “foreseeable side
effect of the generally overwhelming breadth of discretion granted to the
executive by the legislative and judicial branches” and “enabled by the copious
number of substantive criminal offenses and their dwindling definitional
constraints.”222 It is also a product of the expansion of liability rules by courts,
which can lead to criminal prohibitions “broad enough to permit sanctioning of
persons who do not produce the serious harms that gave rise to the liability rule
in the first place.”223 Although the interpretive trend has been to broaden rather
than narrow, courts could construe the existing elements of the offense to
distinguish false statement charges that address institutional harm from those
that just represent prosecutorial opportunism.
I propose restrictive interpretation by the courts mindful of the legitimate
objections other scholars have raised about incremental judicial reforms.224 The
standard prescription in these analyses is instead to cabin overbroad
enforcement with an appeal to prosecutorial discretion.225 But executive selfregulation is difficult to enforce or even observe, given that it is “largely
exercised outside the public eye.”226 Only a small fraction of potential criminal
221. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 650 (1984) (conduct rules may be coextensive with extant
moral norms, but the corresponding decision rule “should define, as clearly and precisely as
possible, a range of punishable conduct that is unquestionably within the bounds of the
community’s relevant moral norm”).
222. Murphy, supra note 25, at 1493–94; see also John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by
Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021,
1067 (1999) (“If Congress writes vague and encompassing federal crimes, it is likely to get
[vague] and encompassing federal prosecutions.”).
223. Buell, supra note 162, at 1523.
224. O’Sullivan, supra note 30, at 670; cf. Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 643, 662–68 (1997) (stating that the Court’s
failure to apply any restrictive interpretation to jurisdictional elements of federal criminal law has
created an excess of offenses for federal prosecutors to charge).
225. See Buell, supra note 162, at 1561 (observing that DOJ is best positioned to “channel
its prosecutors toward the judicious use of broad statutes against the limited set of the most
industrious and harmful actors”). See also generally Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and
the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869 (2009)
(describing the advantages of internal regulation of prosecutors).
226. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 512 n.15 (1997) (Stevens, J. dissenting)
(citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373–74 (1964) (“It will not do to say that a prosecutor’s
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lying cases are prosecuted, but internal sorting to date has focused more on
subjective considerations like the identity of the defendant than an objective
assessment of the gravity of the harm. Nor is legislative pruning likely given
the political economy of criminal justice.227 On the contrary, in recent years
both the House and the Senate have voted to expand the penalties for violations
of § 1001 in terrorism cases and for false statements related to sex offenses.228
The Model Penal Code’s more modest version of the offense—excising
unsworn oral statements, and requiring the “purpose to mislead” an official—
has also been rejected.229
Although there are institutional consequences to after-market
modifications by judges, the courts at least provide a starting point for
clarification. In theory, federal crimes are defined only by statute, and there are
no federal common law crimes,230 but that is “a truth so partial that it is nearly a
lie.”231 Opportunities for interstitial lawmaking may have diminished,232 but the
terms of § 1001 leave room for judges to distinguish between trivial and
nontrivial versions, and thus for judicial intervention to restrain prosecutorial
discretion.233
The materiality requirement could be activated with the harm principle so
that the statute reaches only “those false representations that might
sense of fairness and the Constitution would prevent a successful . . . prosecution for some of the
activities seemingly embraced within the sweeping statutory definitions.”)); O’Sullivan, supra
note 30, at 674.
227. See Barkow, supra note 225, at 911 (increased legislative oversight over prosecutors
“sound[s] promising on paper” but “cannot serve as a realistic check in today’s political climate”).
228. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, §
141, 120 Stat. 587, 603 (2006); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-458, § 6703(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3766 (2004); see also Murphy, supra note 25, at 1465
(“[T]he adoption of tailored—and heightened—penalties for terrorists and sex offenders suggests
that the statute has morphed into more of an all-purpose tool of prosecution . . . .”).
229. Compare Model Penal Code § 241.3 cmt. 2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980), with H.R. Rep. No. 96–1396, at 181–83 (1980). Legislation also failed in 1981 that would
have allowed for a defense when “a false statement consists solely of a denial of involvement in a
crime” and would have limited the criminal prohibition to volunteered statements or statements in
response to questioning “after a warning designed to impress on the defendant the seriousness of
the interrogation and his obligation to speak truthfully.” See S. Rep. No. 97–307, at 407–08
(1981).
230. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
231. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev.
469, 471 (1996) (“To be sure, Congress must speak before a person can be convicted of a federal
crime, but it needn’t say much of anything when it does.”).
232. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 154, at 635 (noting that in recent years Congress
has passed broad criminal prohibitions and left judges out of the process of defining exceptions or
defenses).
233. Id. at 637 (proposing that statutory interpretation “should focus less on plain language
arguments and more on the kind of open-ended criminal justice policy arguments that, not so long
ago, dominated judicial opinions in this area”); see also Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1895 (“We could
return to a system in which criminal law is a species of common law, in which judges rather than
legislatures decide how far a given offense extends. That process will not necessarily produce
supermajoritarian criminal law, but it might come closer than the current regime.”).
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‘substantially impair the basic functions entrusted by law to [the] agency.’”234
The government will be in the best position to assess harm to the investigation,
and it would be the government’s burden to demonstrate that impact as an
element of the offense. In formulating a more precise standard, whether a lie is
induced, how central it is to an investigation, whether a statement actually
misleads or merely inconveniences investigators, and whether the initial
investigation is completed will all factor into the harm it causes. Multifactor
inquiries complicate the task of decisionmakers, particularly jurors, but a
bimodal question as to whether a statement had an actual or potential impact on
the investigation might be viable.235 Such an approach would comport with the
standard definition of material: actually influencing or having a natural
tendency or capacity to influence a decision or function of a federal agency.236
Shifting the focus to the impact on the investigation would also align false
statement cases more closely with the elements of obstruction charges.
Although there is no materiality requirement in the obstruction statute, the
necessary showing of intent often turns on the “nexus” between the obstructive
conduct and an official proceeding.237 More than some remote possibility of
harm should be required to justify punishment, although quantifying the degree
of potential harm might over determine ex ante rather than allow a standard
supple enough to reflect social norms.238
234. United States v. Olson, 751 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1978)).
235. In the context of determining liability for misrepresentations in contract law, for
example, only material misstatements are actionable. This has required courts to deal with
materiality as “a matter of degree, rather than an either-or binary characteristic.” Richard
Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law
and Elsewhere, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 627 (2006). Judges and FTC commissioners, however, have
fashioned context-specific and objective measures of materiality that account for the percentage of
consumers likely to interpret an ad as making a given claim, and the importance of the product
attribute in question, among other factors. Id. at 595–98.
236. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (a material statement has “‘a
natural tendency to influence or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of’ the decision-making
body to which it [is] addressed”); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999) (a
matter is material if “a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question”) (quoting Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 538 (1977)).
237. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005) (defendant lacks
the requisite intent if there is no nexus between the obstructive act and the proceeding); United
States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 697 (10th Cir. 1993) (no obstruction if false statements to FBI did not
have the natural and probable effect of impeding the administration of justice).
238. See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473,
1499 (2007). According to Post and Siegel’s account:
Because the exact meaning of a standard is indeterminate until the circumstances of its
concrete application, a standard always incorporates considerations that cannot be fully
articulated or made explicit. These considerations come from outside the law, so that
law which uses standards necessarily renders itself permeable to the influence of
implicit social norms.
Id.
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The weight of current case law requires consideration only of the
“intrinsic capabilities” of the statement and not its ultimate success, as
measured by collateral circumstances.239 In Brogan, for example, the Court
concluded that “disbelieved falsehoods” give rise to liability because “making
the existence of this crime turn upon the credulousness of the federal investigator (or the persuasiveness of the liar) would be exceedingly strange.”240 Other
courts have held that even the impossibility of influencing agency action does
not constitute a defense.241 The inquiry need not, however, start with the
subjective vantage point of a particular investigator; it should focus instead on
the likely impact of a given statement or omission on a reasonable investigator
under the circumstances. Total disregard for the real or potential impact of
deception precludes meaningful judicial boundary definition. It is hard to
imagine a statement with no “intrinsic capabilities” at all, unless it is gibberish
or unstructured thinking out loud.
The Court has held that materiality is a mixed question of law and fact,242
and standards that incorporate harm rather than the more bright-line “intrinsic
capabilities” rule are workable. I suggest an objective rather than a subjective
standard and would not require specific reliance on false statements. Liability
attaches in the criminal fraud context, for example, even in the absence of
specific reliance.243 In the realm of civil fraudulent representations, objective
requirements of reliance can operate in tandem with concepts of materiality.
Deception is proscribed in very broad terms in tort and contract law; it
encompasses “words and conduct, active deception and passive non-disclosure,
false suggestions and concealment of truth,” falsehoods about “facts, opinions,
or law,” and “evasive half-truths and intentional ambiguities.”244 But all of that
is bounded by the requirement of justified reliance. Fraudulent statements that
are clearly untrue, for example, do not give rise to actions for breach of contract
where it is “objectively unreasonable” to rely on them.245

239. See United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979).
240. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 402 (1998).
241. See, e.g., Valdez, 594 F.2d at 728–29. This is consistent with the courts’ reception of
impossibility arguments in obstruction cases. See United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1228
(2d Cir. 1973) (legal impossibility not a defense to the crime of endeavoring to obstruct justice
even though the government knew of defendant’s actions at all times).
242. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1995).
243. A reliance approach has been widely rejected in the mail and bank fraud context
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s insertion of a materiality requirement. Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1 (1999). See United States v. Rosby, 454 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Merklinger, 16 F.3d 670, 678 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he mail and wire fraud statutes do not require
proof that the intended victim was actually defrauded; the actual success of a scheme to defraud is
not an element of either [18 U.S.C.] § 1341 or § 1343.”).
244. Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 Law & Phil.
393, 404–05 (2003).
245. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Insincere Promises 151 (2005) (discussing
promissory statements that are “mere puff”).
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Materiality as it is currently construed means nothing more than relevant
or on topic, and the definition thus encompasses even patently harmless lies.246
But relevance concerns only the relationship between the statement and the
subject at hand; materiality requires some probative weight to the statement.
Thus, even in the absence of a specific reliance requirement, what the agency
does in response to the lie should factor into the calculus.247 The Ninth Circuit
held as much in overturning a false statement conviction for a defendant who
claimed to customs officials that he had $7,000 in cash when in fact he had
$8,177 but was sent to secondary inspection regardless.248 The possibility,
although not necessarily the actuality, of some form of detrimental reliance
should be analyzed. Although the deception need not ultimately impede the
investigation to be actionable, it ought to have real potential to do so, and the
potential impediment should be more than the bare failure to confess.
The nexus between the primary transgression with which an investigation
originated and the false statement itself should matter as well.249 Lying about
personal issues like transgressions in the context of financial investigations
concerning unrelated conduct will rarely cause material harm. And the
prosecutor’s or agent’s motives also merit consideration.250 Whether there is a
legitimate purpose for questioning, beyond the design to elicit a false statement,
should factor into the inquiry.251 An interaction involving questions with
246. See United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301, 306–07 (4th Cir. 1998) (false statements
were material even though U.S. Attorney recognized them as false); United States v. LeMaster, 54
F.3d 1224, 1230 (6th Cir. 1995) (false statements are material even when the agent suspects
deception); United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1992) (statement deemed
material even though it was “so ludicrous that no IRS agent would believe [it]”); cf. United States
v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505–09 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the forty-two false statement
statutes with an express materiality requirement and fifty-four without are indistinguishable).
247. Cf. Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (the definition of
perjury is not met if “no regard is paid” to the statement) (citing 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *137).
248. United States v. Beltran, 136 Fed. App’x 59 (9th Cir. 2005). But see United States v.
Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 106 (1985) (defendant convicted of false statement for answering “no”
on customs declaration form when carrying more than $5,000, even though referred to secondary
for a search regardless).
249. See, e.g., Glastris, supra note 51, at 25 (“You’re seeing more and more prosecutions
now of lies in which there is no underlying criminal conduct.”) (quoting former Independent
Counsel Michael Zelden in 1998).
250. Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting
Attorney, 55 Geo. L.J. 1030, 1034–35 (1967) (“[T]here are few of us who have led such
unblemished lives as to prevent a determined prosecutor from finding some basis for an
indictment or an information. Thus, to say that the prosecutor’s motive is immaterial, is to justify
making virtually every citizen the potential victim of arbitrary discretion.”); Gershman, supra note
61, at 629 & n.15 (“[C]ourts have frequently suggested that it is impermissible for a prosecutor to
deliberately trap a witness into perjury.”); id. at 687 (proposing that perjury prosecutions be barred
where the prosecutor’s “overriding or ‘dominant purpose’” in questioning a witness “is to extract
perjury”).
251. This objective inquiry would parallel the test for entrapment, which focuses on
governmental intent. See Stephen Michael Everhart, The Clinton Case: Materiality and the
‘Exculpatory No’ Bar to Prosecution?, 108 Penn. St. L. Rev. 727, 738 (2004) (advocating an
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known answers already a matter of record would counsel against a materiality
finding. To borrow from J.L. Austin’s formulation of the functions of speech,
an actionable falsehood must perform more than the locutionary act of
answering investigators’ questions and the illocutionary act of falsely denying;
it must also have some perlocutionary force in terms of contingent effects.252
That is, it ought to produce some effect in the listener, by “convincing,
persuading, or deterring.”253
B.Materiality in Related Contexts
A look at the materiality element in related contexts supports this active
reading. Even as fraud liability has expanded, courts have tethered it to
materiality or harm and applied limiting principles such as requiring that the
material misrepresentations or omissions at issue be of the sort that “would lead
a reasonable employer to change its business conduct.”254 Other courts have
considered harm to the victim or gain to the defendant before sustaining a
deprivation of honest services theory.255
Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1 provides for an enhancement if the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded” the administration of justice, and the
commentary to the guideline requires a showing of materiality when the
enhancement is premised on a false statement. According to the application
notes, a defendant’s false denial of guilt, unless it is under oath, is not a basis
for applying the enhancement.256 In United States v. Aguilar-Portillo, the
Seventh Circuit considered whether “unembellished denials” could support the
sentencing enhancement.257 Although the court concluded that no “exculpatory
no” exception could be sustained, it ruled that the denials themselves were not
actually perjurious. Judge Posner also commented, in United States v. Buckley,
that “a lie that is immaterial to the justice process is not a potential interference
with it,”258 and that to be material there must be some “reasonable probability”

entrapment or due process defense to § 1001 charges that would separate those cases where there
is “a bona fide investigation proceeding on some underlying crime” and “the defendant’s false
‘exculpatory no’ can impede and obstruct an investigation” from those in which “the investigator
is interviewing the defendant with the sole purpose of trapping him into committing a crime”); see
also United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he existence of a ‘legitimate
basis’ for an investigation and for particular questions answered falsely precludes ‘any application
of the perjury trap doctrine.’”) (quoting Wheel v. Robinson, 34 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1994)).
252. See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 95–109 (1962) (defining these
terms).
253. Id. at 109.
254. Mills & Weisberg, supra note 114, at 1398 (citing United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d
660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997) and United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441–42 (8th Cir. 1996)).
255. Id. at 1399 (citing United States v. Jordan, 112 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1997) and United
States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1074–77 (1st Cir. 1997)).
256. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 cmt. n.1 (2008).
257. United States v. Aguilar-Portillo, 334 F.3d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 2003).
258. United States v. Buckley, 192 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1999).
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that the lie will “affect the outcome of the process.”259
A harm-based materiality determination makes sense in light of analogous
state laws as well. While the federal statute has evolved as a broad prohibition,
many state legislatures have adopted more restrictive versions. Several states
maintain a distinction between passive and active dishonesty by witnesses and
suspects in evaluating their interactions with police.260 Courts have distinguished mere responses to inquiries and required not only that defendants act
with intent but that they take the initiative to contact law enforcement as
well.261 Some jurisdictions also account for the harm of a statement or its
impact on the course of the investigation, exclude unsworn false oral statements
from the prohibition or treat them as misdemeanors,262 and tie the penalties for
false statements to the seriousness of the underlying offense being investigated.263
C.Alternatives to Redefining Materiality
One could conclude that applying the materiality standard in light of the
harm caused by a false statement is unnecessary because the mens rea element
already accounts for context and prevents the criminalization of “a broad range
of apparently innocent conduct.”264 Section 1001 does specify that the false
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 765 A.2d 127, 129 (Md. 2001) (false statement to a police
officer does not include answering an investigating police officer’s inquiries untruthfully; the
offense is only committed by one whose false statement causes the police initially to undertake an
investigation or other action).
261. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 542 A.2d 429, 438 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); State v.
McMasters, 815 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); State v. D’Addario, 482 A.2d 961, 964
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (statute proscribing the volunteering of false information to law
enforcement applies only to persons who come forward with information); People ex rel. Morris
v. Skinner, 323 N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (statute penalizing false reports applies only
where the information is “volunteered and is unsolicited,” not when the statement is made in
response to questions); State v. Bailey, 644 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ohio 1994); Commonwealth v.
Neckerauer, 617 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Commonwealth v. Gettemy, 591 A.2d
320, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (the term “volunteer” in statute making it unlawful to hinder
prosecution means that the accused must take the initiative in offering false information); State v.
Levandowski, 955 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn. 1997) (“report” as used in statute criminalizing false
reports to law enforcement does not apply to responses to inquiries by law enforcement).
262. See State v. Brandstetter, 908 P.2d 578, 580 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995) (where defendant
could have remained silent when questioned by law enforcement, unsworn oral misstatement did
not increase officers’ burden and rise to the level of obstruction); see also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
4904 (2005) (requiring a purpose to mislead public officials and downgrading the offense to a
misdemeanor); Mosteller, supra note 36, at 440–41 nn.49–50 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–225
(2005); N.Y. Penal Law § 240.50 (McKinney Supp. 2007); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2921.31(b)
(LexisNexis 2006); Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) (2005)); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a–157b (West
2007) (second degree false statement requires intention “to mislead a public servant in the
performance of his official function”). But see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–2704 (West
2004) (broad prohibition on any statements made in connection with benefits, privileges, licenses,
or official proceedings).
263. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76–8–306 (2008).
264. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985).
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statement be made “knowingly and willfully.” Courts are divided on whether a
specific intent to deceive is required,265 or whether knowingly and willfully
making the statement in question suffices.266 A few decisions have carved out
passive replies to investigative questions,267 and an argument could be made
that deception is not the conscious object268 of a defendant deflecting questioning, responding to an awkward situation, or avoiding self-incrimination. But
reliance on an elevated intent standard is always complicated because intent is
subjective; this complexity is inherent in the assessment of an intent to lie,
which has a multi-dimensional nature and arises from a “cluster of thoughts.”269
Descriptive and normative mens rea are largely intertwined because of the
nature of the offense.270 There is not always a clear answer to the question
“why make the false statement?”271 In many cases, it may be more a reflexive
response than a conscious choice.
Parallel definitional moves by the courts, moreover, have sometimes
broadened rather than narrowed liability when focused on mens rea. In the
obstruction context, courts have interpreted “corruptly” to mean acting with an
improper “purpose of obstructing justice.”272 As Sam Buell points out, that
“question-begging mens rea formulation has meant that the answer to the
question of what behavior counts as criminal obstruction of justice is, in
essence, ‘Anything that is intended to obstruct justice.’”273 The result is “no ex
ante limit on the forms that impermissible obstructive behavior can take.”274
Another alternative limiting principle is a notice requirement. Citizenpolice interactions with “some measure of self-protective falsehoods” are so
common, and the offense is so underenforced, that it is the rare defendant who

265. See, e.g., United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 200 (3d Cir. 1991).
266. The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that intent to deceive is
required. See, e.g., United States v. Shah, 44 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1986).
267. See cases cited supra note 261.
268. See R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency & Criminal Liability: Philosophy of
Action and the Criminal Law 58, 61 (1990) (explaining that an outcome is intended if an
action fails absent achieving that result—when we act “in order to bring about the result”).
269. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 1147, 1176 (2008).
270. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Holistic Culpability, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2523, 2535–
39 (2007) (reasoning that the evaluation of internal state, or descriptive mens rea, which is
definitional with regard to the offense (i.e., the mental state element), is not wholly separate from
the assessment of blamefulness, or normative mens rea, about the meaning (i.e., wickedness) of
the actor’s choice).
271. See G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention 9 (2d ed. 1963) (defining intentional actions as
ones “to which a certain sense of the question ‘why?’ is given application”).
272. See United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 536–37 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The specific
intent required for obstruction of justice under sections 1503 and 1505 is that . . . the act must be
done with the purpose of obstructing justice.”).
273. Buell, supra note 162, at 1544 & n.208 (citing Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82,
86 (2d Cir. 1917) (“[A]ny endeavor to impede and obstruct the due administration of justice . . . is
corrupt.”)).
274. Id.

1 - Griffin FINAL.doc

2009]

1/24/2010 10:36 PM

CRIMINAL LYING

1565

is on notice that false statements may expose her to prosecution.275 Particularly
where no warning is given, and the false statements concern activities that are
not themselves criminal, it is reasonable to question whether an ordinarily lawabiding person in the same situation would have behaved differently.276
Congress has not, however, adopted any mistake of law defense for this
category of crimes, and few courts have entertained it. Justice Ginsburg’s
Brogan concurrence contemplates a possible notice-based safety valve in the
intent requirement; she queries whether knowledge of illegality is required, and
whether the “mere denial of criminal responsibility would be sufficient to prove
such [knowledge].”277
Outside of a narrow context of regulatory offenses, though, willfulness
generally does not require “violation of a known legal duty.”278 For example, in
United States v. Whab, the Second Circuit held that “it is not necessary for the
Government to establish that the defendant knew that he was breaking any
particular law or particular rule.”279 But the court went on to say that, while a
defendant need not have specific knowledge that lying to a federal agent is a
crime, he must be aware of the generally unlawful nature of his actions. This
calls to mind the Supreme Court’s decision in Andersen, which was silent on
the question of a mistake of law defense but concluded that the jury instructions
on the element of obstruction “failed to convey the requisite consciousness of

275. See Mosteller, supra note 36, at 441.
276. See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Securities Fraud and Its Enforcement: The Case of
Martha Stewart, in Insider Trading: Global Developments and Analysis 13, 24 (Paul U.
Ali & Greg N. Gergoriou eds., 2008). Moohr states:
When the law is unclear, persons who are considering some action may not realize they
are in danger of violating criminal laws. This point is particularly relevant in the white
collar context where conduct is often based on ethical lapses, betrayals of trust, and
deceptions that are not always crimes.
Id.; see also A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith, Introduction: Criminalization and the Role of Theory,
in Harm and Culpability, supra note 1, at 1, 10 (“[I]f there is widespread exposure to state
interference for inadvertent wrongdoing, then it is going to be much harder for citizens to plan and
get on with their lives . . . .”) (citing H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of
Responsibility, in Punishment and Responsibility, 158, 181–82 (1968)); John Calvin Jeffries,
Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, Va. L. Rev. 189, 205 (1985)
(“Crimes must be defined in advance so that individuals have fair warning of what is forbidden
. . . .”).
277. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 416 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (adding
that “a trier of fact might acquit on the ground that a denial of guilt in circumstances indicating
surprise or other lack of reflection was not the product of the requisite criminal intent”) (quoting
United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1996)).
278. See Stuntz, supra note 150, at 561–65 (summarizing Ratzlaf and its progeny and
noting the Court’s current unwillingness to expand on mens rea requirements); see also Samuel
W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971, 2009 nn.109–10 (2006) (obstruction is
not the sort of crime that ordinarily allows for a mistake of law defense). But see United States v.
Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994) (knowledge of illegality required to support conviction for
false reports to the FEC).
279. 355 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2004).
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wrongdoing.”280 An intermediate standard along these lines could give more
content to willfulness and provide a useful sorting mechanism to ensure that the
minimum conditions for the attribution of blame are met. The approach to
materiality discussed here actually accounts for notice and for the defendant’s
consciousness of wrongdoing by weighing warnings on the side of materiality.
If a defendant has been apprised of potential liability for false statements—as
she would be, for example, when making an unsworn proffer statement in the
formal setting of the prosecutor’s office—then agents will be more likely to act
on the information she offers.
D.Objections to a Harm-Based Approach
One difficulty with operationalizing this sort of harm-based materiality
standard is that narrowing prosecutions to instances where the statement has
some impact would also increase the number of cases in which a § 1001 charge
is a substitute for another offense.281 If the defendant’s falsehood successfully
raised a barrier to prosecution on the original offense, then it clearly caused
harm to the investigation. There is a tension between the concern with
pretextual prosecutions and a robust materiality requirement. But that might be
addressed by inquiring further into what the focus of the initial investigation
was, whether it was pursued to its logical end, and whether the cover-up
prosecution was a legitimate detour.282 The government should complete
investigations where possible, initiate questioning only with a reasonable
expectation that it will yield probative evidence, and prosecute freestanding
deception only if it stymies the investigation.283 If courts consider false statements in context, they can distinguish between prosecution of an unsuccessful
lie as a placeholder for some other wrongdoing and the prosecution of
deception that actually masked underlying fraud.
Another objection to this approach to materiality is that it reconstitutes the
discarded “exculpatory no” defense. That defense failed in part because it was
simultaneously too broad and too narrow. A distinction between direct and
indirect assertions does not necessarily correlate with moral content or

280. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 706 (2005).
281. Cf. O’Sullivan, supra note 30, at 678 (“It is difficult to promote respect for law, and
law administration, when attempts to impede the effective administration of justice are essentially
permitted if they are successful in preventing prosecutions.”).
282. See Green, supra note 38, at 190.
283. Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should Materiality Be an
Element of Obstruction of Justice?, 44 Washburn L.J. 583, 600. Podgor maintains:
Reading in an element of materiality limits prosecutorial discretion to using obstruction
charges in instances when it is material to the investigation, precluding its use when it
would be inconsequential. In these latter instances, the government is forced to proceed
with the investigation and pursue the substantive conduct that it originally considered
charging.
Id.
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objective impact.284 It may well be that an “exculpatory no” has a detrimental
effect on an investigation, and whether or not it does is a more important
question than the form of the statement.285 Moreover, unlike materiality, the
“exculpatory no” exception found no support in the language of § 1001 and
was struck down on statutory interpretation grounds. A strong materiality
requirement actually comports with § 1001’s language and legislative history.
The 1988 version of the provision provided:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the United States
knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false statements or
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.286
The 1996 amendments to the statute made materiality an element of the
false statement clause as well, clarifying that only “materially false, fictitious,
or fraudulent” statements give rise to liability.287 This change, according to the
legislative history, was intended to confine the statute’s reach to “reasonable
bounds and not allow[] [it] to embrace trivial falsehoods.”288
Although the language has evolved, the question whether a lie will
“pervert” government functions has long informed the statute’s reach.289 Its
New Deal iteration was a prohibition on falsifications that would “seriously
pervert” the work of newly created regulatory agencies,290 and that terminology
found its way into many of the cases upholding the exculpatory no
exception.291 In Brogan v. United States Justice Scalia rejected “the major
premise that only those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions are
covered by § 1001,” but he went on to argue that “since it is the very purpose
of an investigation to uncover the truth, any falsehood relating to the subject of

284. See, e.g., Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 244, at 403–04.
285. See, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1997) (false statements
made to FAA in the form of an “exculpatory no” potentially affected air safety), overruling
recognized by United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2006).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
287. See Restoration of False Statement Penalties, H.R. Rep. No. 104–680, at 8 (1996).
The amendments also clarified that § 1001 applies to all three branches of the federal government.
False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–292, § 2, 110 Stat. 3459, 3459
(1996).
288. See United States v. Gafyczk, 847 F.2d 685, 691 (11th Cir. 1988).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) (section 1001 imposes
liability for statements “to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and
agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described”).
290. See Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967), abrogated by
United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984), as recognized in United States v. RodriguezRios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1050 (5th Cir. 1994).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 717–19 (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183–84 (1st Cir. 1975).
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the investigation perverts that function.”292 What we know about the structure
of investigations and the social psychology of agent interviews is that not just
“any falsehood” can derail an investigation. A Fourth Circuit decision
summarizes this view:
A trained agent cannot be overly surprised when a suspected criminal
fails to admit his guilt. . . . “[A] thorough agent would continue
vigorous investigation of all leads until he personally is satisfied he has
obtained the truth.” A false denial of guilt does not pervert the
investigator’s basic function in the manner the statute was intended to
combat, but is merely one of the ordinary obstacles confronted in a
criminal investigation.293
Even though the modern version of the statute dispenses with the “perversion” requirement, it still, on its face, demands proof that a lie was capable of
deceiving, affecting, or influencing agency action.294 Congress’s extension of
the materiality standard is not, in its present form, carving out trivial falsehoods
as intended. Reading the materiality element to require more than some
falsehood “related” to the investigation and accounting as well for the actual or
potential impact of the deception would better accomplish that purpose.
Evaluating the resulting harm before imposing criminal liability also
raises the problem of “moral luck”295 because it means that culpability will
depend in part on factors outside the control of the defendant.296 The distinction
between lies that have an impact on the underlying investigation and trivial
falsehoods thus implicates a much broader dispute about the significance of
harm in the criminal law. On the question of liability for inchoate offenses, for
example, “[g]enerations of theorists have sought to explain why we punish
actual homicide more severely than attempted homicide, the real spilling of
blood more severely than the unrealized intent to do so.”297 One theory holds
that state interference with a citizen’s behavior ought to be “reasonably necessary,”298 and that threshold requirements should shield harmless conduct from
liability. Doug Husak has argued, for example, that criminal liability can only
be imposed where a statute punishes a nontrivial harm.299 Another substantial
292. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 402 (1998).
293. United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v.
Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1986)), abrogated by Brogan, 522 U.S. at 401, 408.
294. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 402–04; see also, e.g., United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 650
(5th Cir. 1997).
295. See Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, June
3, 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/entires/moral-luck/.
296. See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 131 (1968) (“Why should the
accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be a ground for punishing less a
criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally wicked?”).
297. George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense 82 (1988). As Fletcher explains,
the account is not satisfactory. But while we “cannot adequately explain why harm matters,”
“matter it does.” Id. at 83.
298. See Feinberg, supra note 111, at 11.
299. Husak, supra note 118, at 66; see also, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 174, at
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body of scholarship rejects the objectivist account300 and concludes that results
are irrelevant to responsibility and blameworthiness.301 Although I cannot
rehearse even a fraction of this rich debate here, I do want to suggest that
investigative lies that neither risk nor gain anything offer one lens through
which the discussion could come into focus. Making finer distinctions to determine which false statements merit prosecution provides one example of how
attention to harm might address broader concerns about overcriminalization.
CONCLUSION
The risk of overcharging and the potential expressive consequences of the
divide between norms and crimes call for a morally justifiable and practically
workable grading of false statements. It is impossible to predict the impact of
refining the materiality inquiry with the sort of “scientific confidence” that
governs social science, but the foregoing analysis provides at least some
“political confidence” in the net effect of taking the materiality element of the
false statement offense seriously.302 A requirement informed by the harm
principle could draw sharper lines that better comport with the community’s
views of just deserts.303 Narrowing the liability rule could lower the threat
value of the offense and raise the costs of prosecution,304 thereby motivating
202 (concluding that “each time the criminal law convicts a blameless person, it calls into
question, in some small way, the legitimacy of every other criminal conviction”); Wiley, supra
note 222, at 1051 (“The Court will interpret a statute to require the government to prove moral
blameworthiness if the Court can imagine an extreme hypothetical in which the government’s
interpretation would reach action that is not culpable according to an unwritten moral code.”).
300. According to R.A. Duff’s summary of the subjectivist approach:
[I]n any particular case either success or failure, either the occurrence or the nonoccurrence of harm, will typically involve an element of luck; and subjectivists can thus
argue, without exaggerating the role of luck, that such luck should not affect criminal
liability. . . . [I]f criminal convictions and punishments are to reflect, as they should,
appropriate judgments of culpability, they too should therefore be based on the agent’s
active choices, not on the actual outcomes of his actions.
R.A. Duff, Subjectivism, Objectivism and Criminal Attempts, in Harm and Culpability, supra
note 1, at 19, 35–36.
301. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Crime & Culpability: A
Theory of Criminal Law 195 (2009) (“[R]esults do not matter for blameworthiness or
punishability.”). See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1497 (1974).
302. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Laws and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City,
32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 805, 807 (1998); cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 221, at 637 (much
“jurisprudential theorizing” “is incapable of empirical proof, because it claims not the status of a
falsifiable causal theory, but only the more modest one of a plausible and occasionally
illuminating interpretation”).
303. Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Harm and Evil in Criminal Law: A Study in Legislative
Deception?, 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 299, 322 (1994); see also R.A. Duff, Criminal
Attempts 352 (1997) (“The character of [a defendant’s] wrongdoing depends . . . upon its actual
outcome: it matters to us, and should matter to him, whether he did the harm which he attempted
to do.”).
304. Stuntz, supra note 150, at 552; see also Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm
Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation, in Harm and Culpability, supra note 1, at
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prosecutors to focus on the underlying offenses rather than on the defendant’s
response to the investigation itself. It could also encourage prosecutors and
agents to privilege accuracy over efficiency by expanding warning
requirements and notice to defendants. If the incidence of charges for trivial
misconduct and pretextual prosecutions decreases as a result, the prosecutions
that do proceed will also clarify signals to cooperate with investigators and
comply with the law.

259, 259 (“The harm principle served as a valuable antidote, a way of keeping the scope of the
criminal law modest.”).

